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ABSTRACT 
 
The Challenges of Network Security Remediation at a Regional University 
by 
William R. Simons 
 
This thesis describes challenges encountered during a year-long effort to 
improve the security of the 3,300 node administrative computer network at East 
Tennessee State University.  The key remediation strategies used included 
employing the vulnerability scanner Nessus to profile the network, analyzing the 
scan results, and attempting to remove the most critical vulnerabilities found.  
The project succeeded in decreasing known “high” criticality vulnerabilities on 
campus by 26.1%, and confirmed four standard observations about the 
challenges of network administration: 
 
• Vulnerability scanning is a lengthy task best performed in parallel 
and supported by automated data analysis. 
 
• Securing a network is like trying to hit a moving target, due to an 
ever-increasing proliferation of networked hosts, services enabled 
by default install and lists of vulnerabilities to address. 
 
• Failures of common sense are still among the primary threats to 
network security. 
 
• Failing to retain management support for the security hardening 
process can jeopardize the project. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis details a year-long effort to determine and document the 
challenges of improving network and computer security at a medium-sized 
regional academic institution, East Tennessee State University (ETSU).  At the time 
of research, the ETSU administrative computer network (151.141.0.0/16) consisted 
of 58 subnets containing approximately 3,300 total nodes which are 
administered and maintained by the ETSU Office of Information Technology 
(OIT) staff.  The 3,300 nodes include server and workstation computers, network 
printers, routers, hubs, switches, wireless access points and personal digital 
assistants.  ETSU has approximately 11,000 students and 3,000 faculty and 
administrative staff.   
Originally, the research goal was to conduct a more extensive case study 
of network security vulnerability remediation than the one presented here.  The 
initial proposal involved a systematic attempt to detect, and address, all readily 
detectable vulnerabilities on campus.  This work was to include a monitoring of 
all costs associated with performing said research and remediation.  Performing 
these tasks required local or domain level administrative credentials, which I was 
originally promised but later denied, due to my student enrollment and lack of 
full-time ETSU-OIT employee status.  The study that was actually performed 
focused on identifying specific high criticality level vulnerabilities present on the 
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ETSU administrative network and observing the challenges that hindered the 
vulnerability assessment and remediation processes. 
The data for this research was gathered using a mixture of node-specific 
and campus-wide vulnerability sweeps using the open source vulnerability 
scanner Nessus (versions 1.2.6 thru 2.1.0) [http://www.nessus.org], and the open 
source network exploration application Nmap (versions 3.00 beta thru 3.50) 
[http://www.insecure.org/nmap].  Each application was compiled, maintained, 
routinely updated, and used on a Red Hat Linux (versions 7.2 thru 9.0) 
[http://www.redhat.com] system which I administered.  The Nessus and Nmap 
scans started in May 2002 and ended in June 2003, with a supplemental Nmap 
service discovery sweep in February, 2004. 
 
1.1 Challenges Encountered 
 
This study confirmed four standard observations about the challenges of 
implementing network security in large computing environments.  These 
observations address the issues of scale, automation, process management, 
and organizational roadblocks encountered at a management level. 
 
• Domain level vulnerability scanning is a massive task that is best 
performed in parallel by multiple servers and supported by 
automated data analysis.  On average, a complete, sequential 
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scan using one Nessus server of a single host took approximately 16 
minutes to complete.  A sweep of the ~3,300 node ETSU network 
took 10 days, and generated over 21,000 lines of vulnerability report 
data.  One of this thesis’s contributions, a set of supplemental 
applications for summarizing Nessus vulnerability detail output, 
digested and created a report using the full campus sweep data in 
approximately 10 minutes versus the estimated 17 hours it would 
have taken to review the data manually. 
 
• Securing a network is difficult, due to an ever-increasing 
proliferation of networked hosts and default-install services, and an 
ever-increasing queue of vulnerabilities to search for and repair.  
The number of vulnerable Telnet, FTP, and HTTP servers increased by 
approximately 100 every six months during this project, primarily due 
to the increasing amount of embedded administration user 
interfaces in hardware devices such as routers and switches and 
default-install services in standard Windows and Linux operating 
system installations.  During the research and remediation tasks, the 
number of high-risk vulnerabilities detected by the Nessus sweeps 
decreased 26.1% from 1,211 to 895.  However, during this same 
period the total number of vulnerabilities that Nessus scanned for 
increased from 933 to 2,088, or 223.8%.  While these quantitative 
results do not show a complete security hardening of the campus, 
they do show an overall decrease of high-risk vulnerabilities directly 
related to the work performed.  These high-risk vulnerabilities were 
affecting 36.7% of campus at the beginning of the research, and 
27.1% of campus at the end, even with thirteen months of new 
vulnerabilities becoming known and vulnerability plug-ins being 
created by the Nessus community and being made public. 
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• Failures of common sense are still among the most critical problems 
for administrators to address.  One operational Trojan horse, 15 
administration accounts with null or extremely simplistic passwords, 
and over 800 unnecessary or unknown services were found during 
the initial campus vulnerability sweep. 
 
• Failing to retain organizational support for the duration of the 
security remediation process can cause the entire project to come 
to a complete standstill.  Problems with organizational support, 
which occurred several times during this research, included failure 
to keep an agreement to grant administrator credentials needed to 
facilitate the original study, and inconsistencies in operating 
procedures and expectations created by a turnover in 
management personnel, due to an insourcing of ETSU’s IT function.  
 
This research’s primary contribution is the evidence it presents to support 
the preceding conclusions, evidence that should prove useful to IT 
management, system, network, and application administrators in the computer 
and network security field. 
Malicious computer hackers use academic institutions, which are 
perceived as lightly funded organizations which rarely pursue prosecutions, as 
training grounds to hone their skills and enhance their prestige among peers.  I 
believe that the challenges encountered, the applications created and the 
data gathered while addressing computer, network and application 
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vulnerabilities at ETSU will mirror those faced by businesses, home computer 
users, and other academic institutions, and will prove valuable for forecasting 
required security hardening and remediation costs across various domains. 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into four chapters:  Chapter 2, 
Background, describes the idea origins of this research, background security 
research performed, details specific threats and strategies for network security, 
and discusses the vulnerability assessment strategies and commercial tools used 
for this research.  Chapter 3, Research Methodology, describes the goals, 
network and social environment, metrics, data gathering procedures and 
software tools created for use in this research.  Chapter 4, Project History and 
Findings describes early events, initial lessons learned from the security 
hardening and remediation process, presents the study’s key conclusions, 
together with the evidence for these findings.  Chapter 5, Conclusion, 
summarizes the work performed, and presents a list of final recommendations 
and the eventual actions taken by site management. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND 
 
This chapter describes the idea origins for this research, security specific 
background research performed, details specific threats and strategies for 
computer and network security, and discusses the vulnerability assessment 
strategies and commercial tools used for this research. 
 
2.1 Idea Origins 
 
The idea for this research was born from my underlying interest and future 
employment hopes in network and computer security and from multiple 
conversations with my original thesis advisor, Dr. Phil Pfeiffer IV.  One of these 
conversations alerted me to a related thesis by fellow graduate student,  James 
P. Ashe (Jim).  Jim was using the open source vulnerability assessment 
application Nessus to profile and assess the ETSU administrative network.  His 
data described the number of vulnerabilities found per host, and detailed the 
highest risk protocols, operating systems, applications and services.  His data, 
when combined with mine, could be used to show a computer security 
hardening of the ETSU administrative network over a 3 year period. 
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2.2 Computer and Network Security Background 
 
Computer, network and application security are growing in importance, 
thanks to the increasing value of electronic data and that data’s impact on 
and permeation into the public domain [Reynolds].  Computer security is “the 
process of preventing and detecting unauthorized use of a computer” 
[Howard].  A comparable definition holds for network and application security, 
even though each is a distinct entity with different vulnerabilities.   
The increasing importance of security affects businesses, the private 
sector and academia in strikingly similar ways, which should dovetail with 
challenges encountered in said domains and led to the research presented 
here.  Academic institutions, in particular, have historically been negligent in 
security practices, allowing hackers to gain control of portions of their networks 
through fairly simple means [Schwartau].  A lack of funding is often cited as a 
key reason for inattention to security in academia.  The research results 
presented here could be used to support grants for further research into 
academic network security, for increases of security budgets, and for educating 
the general public about the severity of security threats to academic networks.  
The focus of this research is virtual security: the task of securing information 
stored in computers; messages transmitted through a computer network; and 
resources accessed through on-line commands [Schneier].  Virtual security is 
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distinguished from physical security, which involves limiting physical access to a 
system’s hardware.  Physical security, although an important part of overall 
information security, is not a focus of this research. 
 
2.3  Threats and Fixes to Network and System Security 
 
2.3.1  Vulnerability Definition 
 
A security vulnerability is commonly defined as anything that offers a 
potential avenue of attack against a system or network [TECS], for example, 
viruses, improper system or application configurations, application backdoors, 
and Trojan horses.  In this research, the term vulnerability is used in a more limited 
sense, to refer to flaws in a program’s configuration or logic that allow an 
attacker to receive escalated privileges, disable application or service 
operation or compromise computer data; that have been publicized in a well-
known listing of vulnerability reports; and that can be successfully neutralized, 
using a publicly released fix, patch, or workaround.  This more specific definition 
of vulnerability is consistent with current expectations of system administrators, 
who, as a rule, apply available vulnerability fixes (vulnerability remediation)—
and don’t create them.  This remediation process typically includes changing 
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file permissions, applying a group or domain level policy, setting an Operating 
System configuration option or installing an available patch. 
 
2.3.2  Specific Threats to Network Security 
 
2.3.2.1  Cleartext Network Transmission.  The basic unit of information 
transfer in computer networks is the packet: a fragment of control or data 
information whose size depends on the underlying network technology.  
Numerous applications have been created that passively intercept and copy all 
network traffic on a system, server, router or firewall [Chirillo].  These applications, 
called protocol analyzers or sniffers, obtain access to network traffic by 
exploiting the underlying network’s topology or by masquerading as a network 
routing hardware device.  Since computer systems commonly exchange 
messages in cleartext [Steinke], protocol analyzers allow potential attackers to 
intercept and alter information that they are not entitled to access, including 
user authentication data.  
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2.3.2.2  Misconfigured and/or Unpatched Applications.  Most 
manufacturers of applications and operating systems issue fixes for potential 
security holes in response to known exploits [Schwartau].  As a network security 
“best practice”, these patches and hot fixes should be installed as they become 
available, by the Information Technology support staff [Limoncelli].  
Unfortunately, standard home users, small business operators and universities 
generally lack the technical proficiency or budget to apply patches as they are 
released.  This inability to keep current is the primary reason malicious hackers 
have opportunities to penetrate a computer or network host. 
 
2.3.2.3  Well-known or Default Install Accounts.  Well-known accounts, 
those that applications create or support by default, are standard avenues for 
system or network compromise.  These accounts include ‘root’, ‘admin’, ‘guest’, 
‘administrator’, ‘sa’, and ‘operator’ to name a few.  Another best practice in 
network and computer security is to rename these well-known accounts for 
administrative use, and then to create unprivileged, “dummy” accounts in their 
place [Technet].  Activity involving the newly created dummy ‘root’, ‘admin’, 
‘guest’, ‘administrator’, ‘sa’, or ‘operator’ accounts can then be monitored 
using application, system, and network logs as a security check for attempted, 
non-authorized intrusions.  The combination of these “best practices” of network 
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security, when implemented successfully, constitute host or network defense-in-
depth. 
 
2.3.2.4  Denial of Service Attacks.  Denials of Service (DoS), Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS), and Out of Band (OoB) attacks have become 
common because they are easy and inexpensive to implement [Schneier].  
Such attacks hurt their victims by monopolizing the target’s resources.  DoS and 
DDoS attacks consume resources on the target machine or network, impeding 
their normal operation.  Out of Band attacks use oversized, malformed, 
fragmented or otherwise specifically altered individual or packet streams to 
disrupt the target machine’s TCP stack. 
DoS and DDoS attacks, although primitive in complexity, can be 
devastating in the real world [Scambray].  An example DoS/DDoS attack is the 
CHARGEN attack on Microsoft’s SQL Ping service.  This service, which is installed 
by default with Microsoft SQL Server 2000, allows a client to ping a port of the 
client’s choice.  Hackers can disable a host that supports this service by creating 
simple scripts that continually request this service to ping a CHARGEN service on 
another machine.  Every custom-crafted packet sent to CHARGEN causes 
millions of packets to be directed to the victim’s machine.  A few compromised 
machines, or zombies, running these scripts are enough overwhelm the SQL 
server’s ability to respond, thereby disabling the database service.  Fortunately, 
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Microsoft implemented the SQL ping service running on a UDP port, which differs 
from a TCP port and does not require a full end to end connection.  Because of 
this UDP implementation, more attempts are needed to disrupt the service.  Still, 
the service is installed by default on SQL Server 2000 and creates a DoS target. 
The innate problem with defending against DoS, DDoS, OoB and flood 
attacks is their inherent simplicity.  Script Kiddies—novice hackers who depend 
on other people’s scripts to perform attacks—can effectively disrupt or disable 
access to network or computer resources without the level of technical 
practical understanding usually associated with hacking attacks.  These styles of 
attacks can vary from the small and mildly annoying case of tying up a shared 
printer or resource, to the extremely costly disruption of an enterprise level web 
or database server. 
 
2.3.3  Strategies for Breaking into Computers and Networks 
 
Strategies for breaking into single computers and networks of computers 
are similar.  In most cases, hackers who target an unfamiliar network or 
computer will footprint (i.e., scout) it to determine the network structure, 
defenses and possibly the hardware and software in use [Scambray].  
Footprinting can involve rummaging through trash for discarded data, using 
network transmissions to determine the operating system or services in use, and 
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searching news groups for informative email from the target organization 
[Scambray].  A relatively new form of footprinting involves web log (blog) 
searches for employee online journals.  Blogs, like newsgroup postings and the 
other footprinting sources described, can betray the target organization’s 
underlying policies, procedures, applications and hardware. 
Footprinting can occur from inside and outside a network, although 
footprinting from outside is the most common [Schwartau].  A key objective of a 
footprinting session is to discover a system’s or network’s open ports and the 
privilege levels of the applications that “own” these ports.  Open ports are 
analogous to open doors into the target system or network.  Every open port is 
associated with a program that “owns” it: i.e., responds to requests directed 
toward that port.  Microsoft SQL Server 2000 runs by default on port 1433.  Most 
web servers run by default on port 80.  Almost all services have an associated 
default port.  The level of privilege of the program that owns a given port 
determines the damage that hacker that subverts that port can do.  If, for 
example, a port is open and the attached service is running as user “root” or 
“administrator”, a compromise of the service attached to that port will afford a 
hacker high level root or administrative access to the underlying system or 
network device. 
Footprinting would be used by an intruder to discover services available 
to the public.  An administrator discussing current projects on a newsgroup, a 
faculty member posting their thoughts on the current mail server roll-out, or 
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simple port scanning of the academic network IP range can advise the hacker 
of the application/server version and patch levels, and from that point the trivial 
next step to research available vulnerabilities for the services found on the 
academic network.  Entry level hackers use Nessus to profile a target, and get 
an extremely descriptive readout on potential areas of attack.  This would 
generate a large signature easily tracked by administrators by reviewing access 
log files, but generally isn’t watched for by Universities due to the previously 
discussed budgetary concerns found in academia. 
 
2.4  Security Vulnerability Assessments 
 
2.4.1  Motivation for Vulnerability Assessment 
 
Information security authorities advise administrators to conduct regular 
assessments of their networks’ vulnerability level, as a starting point for 
discovering and repairing known vulnerabilities [Bott].  Since networked 
communication is managed through a system’s network ports, those ports are 
the starting point for checking for vulnerabilities.  An administrative awareness of 
a system or network’s open ports, vulnerabilities, and services also increases the 
ability to determine available avenues for attack or even when an attack may 
be underway. 
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2.4.2  Strategies for Vulnerability Assessment 
 
The two principal strategies for assessing security vulnerabilities are black 
box [Webopedia] and crystal box [Lam] assessment.  In a black box assessment, 
the security auditor performs a stock set of network-based probes and scans on 
the target domain; no inside knowledge of the target computer or network 
environment is assumed.  This style of probing and scanning simulates the 
footprinting performed by an external hacker with a limited knowledge of the 
target system.  In a crystal box vulnerability assessment, the intrusion test team is 
provided with insider knowledge of the system to be tested, typically in the form 
of network diagrams and system names, IP addresses, platforms, and lists of 
services and datasets hosted by the network’s devices.  This testing strategy 
simulates an attack by a disgruntled employee, or a collusion situation involving 
multiple attackers with insider information. 
 
2.4.3  Vulnerability Assessment Tools 
 
At the time of writing, there is no single vulnerability assessment 
application that performs all of the different audits recommended by authorities 
on network security.  Accordingly, system and network administration best 
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practice involves the use of multiple scanning applications and techniques to 
help ensure network security.  The work described in this thesis relied on two 
commonly used applications for assessing network security: the Nmap port 
scanner and the Nessus vulnerability auditor. 
 
2.4.3.1  Nmap.  Nmap is a port scanning security auditor used in both 
black and crystal box assessment that supports the use of three strategies for 
footprinting hosts.  Nmap can ping a set of hosts to determine which hosts are 
alive, and scan a host’s ports to determine what services it supports.  Nmap can 
also use a database of characteristics to determine what operating system a 
host is running.  By default, Nmap performs a ping sweep to find live hosts and 
scans their ports, using the standard services-to-port reference matrix included 
with the Nmap installation.  Nmap can scan network hosts using one of six 
methods: TCP connect() scans, TCP SYN scans, stealth FIN scans, Xmas tree 
scans, Null scans, UDP scans, and ping scans. 
Nmap identifies services using its service-to-port association matrix.  This 
allows some margin of error, as a FTP server (default port 21) configured to run 
on port 23 (the default port for Telnet) will return as a Telnet server in Nmap.  This 
use of non-standard ports is typically motivated by a desire to evade firewall 
controls—ISP’s, for example, routinely block port 80, prompting some users of 
broadband Internet services to run web servers on port 8080—or to disguise a 
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service’s presence.  Using non-standard ports to enhance system security is not 
considered a best practice: a determined attacker will locate these services, 
using techniques like complete port scanning and banner enumeration and 
banner recognition [Scambray].   
 
2.4.3.2  Nessus.  The Nessus vulnerability assessment tool was first released 
to the public in April of 1998 [Kooij].   At the time of research, Nessus is not 
funded by any corporate entities or committees, and is maintained as a 
community service by its authors and a small group of Nessus enthusiasts.  Nessus 
is structured as a two-part application that consists of a server (Nessusd) 
application, which probes target systems, and a client (Nessus) application, 
which submits requests for probes to the server.  The client is currently available 
for UNIX and Windows platforms, while the server is only available for Unix-based 
machines. 
Nessus attempts to locate vulnerabilities by communicating with hosts, 
using standard application protocols.  For example, if Nessus determines it is 
testing a web server, Nessus will communicate with the server using HTTP.  If 
Nessus is testing a Windows share or fileserver, it will communicate using NetBIOS 
and SMB. 
Nessus supports two primary strategies for vulnerability checking:  banner 
recognition and service-specific testing [Deraison1].  Service-specific testing, 
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which uses a sequence of application-specific messages to identify the remote 
application, was incorporated into Nessus on the assumption that neither 
banners nor version numbers can be relied on for service discovery and 
vulnerability assessment.  Nessus can even be configured to attack the targeted 
host, thereby reducing the number of false positives in the vulnerability 
assessment.  Attacking a machine, however, can crash that machine or disrupt 
its services and is not advised in a production environment.   
Nessus can be controlled using its graphical user interface, or with 
command line batch scripts.  Nessus uses a built in proprietary scripting 
language, based on C, called the Nessus Attack Scripting Language (NASL) 
[Deraison3].  A standard set of scripts for identifying standard exploits is 
distributed through the Nessus website, at http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins.  Each 
prepackaged script, or plug-in, usually references a CERT, Bugtraq, or vendor 
security alert for associated vulnerability.  As of summer 2004, there were 2,088 
Nessus plug-in tests, divided into 23 different families that included Backdoors, 
CGI abuses, CISCO, Denial of Service, Finger abuses, Firewalls, FTP, Remote shell 
access, Remote root access, General, Misc., Netware, NIS, Port scanners, 
Remote file access, RPC, Settings, SMTP problems, SNMP, Untested, Useless 
services, Windows and Windows:User management.   
 Nessus’s architecture allows network administrators to craft their own 
vulnerability checks for exploits that do not yet have associated plug-ins.  The 
library of standard Nessus plug-ins, however, is updated routinely as new 
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vulnerabilities appear.  NASL plug-ins for high-profile exploits have been created 
in as little as two hours following the public disclosure of those exploits. 
Nessus creates host vulnerability reports in many different formats, 
including XML, HTML, ASCII, LaTeX, and a proprietary format called NSR 
[Deraison2].  These reports list all detected vulnerabilities, usually citing links to 
fixes and risk levels from Low to Very High.  Network scans, unfortunately, 
generate an enormous amount of raw text, and must be used in conjunction 
with some type of digesting utility to make them manageable.  Such a utility is 
described in section 3.4.2.1 and in Appendix B.2. 
The Nessus server runs as root, allowing Nessus to craft packets, access the 
libpcap library, and bind ports below 1024 to sockets.  Nessus uses Nmap to 
implement port scanning, Nikto and/or Whisker to identify and probe Web 
servers and CGIs, and Hydra to provide brute force attacks for common services 
(telnet, web, pop3, Imap, etc.) [Deraison4]. 
Nessus uses a lot of bandwidth for scanning, as noted by the following 
observation in the Nessus FAQ:   
“Now assume we test 65536 TCP ports.  This will require at least a single 
packet per port that is at least 40 bytes large.  Add 14 bytes for the 
ethernet (sic) header and you will send 65536 * (40 + 14) = 3670016 
bytes.  So for just probing all TCP ports we may need a multitude of this 
as Nmap will try to resend the packets twice if no response is received.  
A very rough estimate is that a full scan for UDP, TCP and RPC as well as 
all NASL scripts may result in 8 to 32 MB wrth (sic) of traffic per scanned 
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host. Reducing the amount of tested part and such will reduce the 
amout (sic) of data to be transfered (sic) significantly.”   [Kooij] 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter describes the research goals, planning, network environment, 
metrics, procedures and software tools created and used during the year long 
security hardening process. 
 
3.1  Research Goals 
 
The research presented here sought to determine the approximate cost 
of security hardening ETSU’s network, and the benefits that would accrue to the 
university from this work.  A four-part plan was used to pursue this goal: 
 
• identify network and system vulnerabilities on campus; 
 
• advise the OIT staff of the most critical vulnerability instances found; 
 
• monitor costs associated with performing the vulnerability sweeps; 
and 
 
• extrapolate to obtain an approximate assessment of the costs 
accrued from hardening the security of the campus network. 
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3.2  Research Environment 
 
At the time of this research, the ETSU administrative computer network 
(151.141.0.0/16) consisted of 58 subnets containing approximately 3,300 total 
nodes, administered and maintained by the ETSU OIT staff.  The ETSU 
administrative computer network included approximately 80 servers, 2900 
workstation computers and 300 printers, routers, hubs, switches, wireless access 
points and personal digital assistants [Ashe].  ETSU has approximately 11,000 
students and 3,000 faculty and administrative staff.  The vulnerability scans for 
this research started in May 2002 and ended in June 2003, with a supplemental 
Nmap service discovery sweep in February, 2004. 
I was allowed to use one Nessus server, which ran on a Pentium 2 
workstation running at 400Mhz with 384 megabytes of RAM.  I also had access to 
a Windows 2000 workstation, which was of similar hardware configuration.  The 
supplemental applications created and discussed in this document in section 
3.4.2 were done so using a Dell Inspiron 8100 laptop which I own. 
 
3.3  Research Metrics 
 
Two main strategies were used to assess the effectiveness of the security 
assessment procedures used in this research.  First, the number of “high” 
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criticality flaws discovered by Nessus during the initial rounds of campus 
vulnerability sweeps were compared with those found during the final round of 
sweeps thirteen months later.  This data, paired with the number of hosts on 
campus and the total number of vulnerabilities Nessus was searching for, gave a 
percentage of campus hosts affected by high-risk vulnerabilities.  Second, 
unknown service permeation across campus was also tracked, using Nmap to 
sweep the campus and identify all services available at the beginning and end 
of the research.  
 
3.4  Research Procedures 
 
70% of the scans performed during this research started as a complete 
campus sweep for a single, or a select few, high priority vulnerabilities.  Scan 
targets were selected based on their Nessus assigned priority and the wishes of 
my OIT supervisors.  The remaining scans, which I referred to as “go to guy” 
scans, were normally requested on short notice and required prompt attention.  
These included scans of campus mail servers, and checks for specific NETBIOS 
names, specific open ports, and recently disclosed day-0 type vulnerabilities.  
Since OIT, in an effort to conserve network bandwidth and intrusiveness, allowed 
me to perform no more than one scan at any one time, and use only one 
machine for the duration of my research, these “go to guy” scans required me 
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to interrupt any scan that was currently underway and dedicate my Nessus 
server effort to the new scan task. 
Nessus vulnerability sweeps, either of a host or an entire network, generate  
NSR Nessus vulnerability assessment files.  These files are extremely large in size, 
and a small sample of a file is presented in Appendix D.2.1 of this document.   
After reviewing the Nessus generated vulnerability information for campus, 
I was tasked with contacting the primary user of the affected machine and my 
OIT support representative to schedule a patch appointment.  I used templated 
email correspondence in an effort to decrease the amount of time it took to 
schedule and complete a “round-trip” vulnerability patching session. 
 
3.4.1  Data Gathering 
 
Network vulnerability assessments used a hybrid of the crystal and black 
box approaches.  Assessments were performed inside the campus network 
firewall, but with a purposely limited knowledge of system functionality and 
network topology.  This style of scanning simulated footprinting by a typical on-
campus user:  e.g., a rogue student, a former employee, or a malicious outsider 
who used an unsecured wireless access point to scout the campus network.  This 
strategy also generated a more complete characterization of ETSU network 
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security, as the campus firewall did not shield many of the vulnerabilities that I 
detected because of port-based incoming firewall rules. 
The Nmap port scanner was used to footprint ETSU’s networks because it is 
fast, convenient, and free: currently, there are no other tools available that are 
as fast, accurate and widely used as Nmap.  Nessus’s “safe mode”, which relies 
entirely on banner recognition for vulnerability assessment, was used to check 
for specific vulnerabilities.  “Safe mode” was used because the alternative, the 
use of actual exploit code, was deemed too potentially damaging to 
production services and devices on the ETSU administrative network. 
Over the course of the research, I conducted 39 complete campus 
sweeps.  Most of these sweeps were specific to a few high profile or recently 
discovered vulnerabilities.  Most sweeps were conducted between Tuesday 
morning and Thursday evening, when it was found that most nodes on campus 
were accessible.  Generally, Nessus was used to find vulnerabilities, while Nmap 
was used to locate new services available on the network or to get a quick list 
of a particular type of service (email, web, etc.).  These sweeps lasted from 
several hours up to 10 days.  I wrote a set of scripts to automate sweeps, and to 
allow “major” sweeps to be paused and restarted following “go-to guy” scan 
interruption.  I also used SSH to remotely log in to my ETSU computer and check 
on the status of a sweep at any time.  This afforded me complete 24/7 access, 
even when my computer was locked up after hours in the ETSU OIT data center. 
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Unfortunately, the resulting Nessus generated vulnerability assessments 
were full of false positives, thanks to the all too common practice of application 
creators distributing patches that fail to update an application’s version or 
release number.  Nessus running in safe mode relies on banners and version 
numbers to assess patch levels.  This practice incorrectly interprets a patched 
machine with an incorrect version number as being vulnerable to a particular 
exploit, when it is not.  When an OIT representative would visit a machine and 
identify a Nessus-reported vulnerability as a false positive, we would mark the 
vulnerability resolved, and take no further action.  False positives became an 
increasing problem during my own research, but I never tracked them, or 
measured the time they took to resolve.  In the future, studies like this that rely on 
Nessus should track false positives and account for their drain on staff time. 
 
3.4.2  Creating Custom Applications 
 
During my research, I developed several administrative scripts and four 
major supporting applications for Nessus: an .NSR parser, a command line Nessus 
daemon respawner, a remote TCP service monitor and a localhost file 
modification watcher.  These scripts and applications reduced the time needed 
to analyze NSR vulnerability report data by as much as 17x, and simplified Nessus 
administrative duties such as backing up the research data, ensuring services 
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were up and running, parsing the system logs for important information, and 
downloading operating system updates to ensure my Nessus server was kept up 
to date. 
 
3.4.2.1  Nessus Log Parsers (VB6.0 and VBA 6.3).  Each Nessus vulnerability 
scan of the ETSU administrative network created over 21,000 lines of vulnerability 
result information.  As part of an earlier study (cf. §2.1), James Ashe created a 
C++ .NSR parser that reduced the content of a Nessus vulnerability scan to 
matrix form.  I used Visual Basic 6 to extend his application into an .NSR report 
parser that creates a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet of critical vulnerabilities 
detected during a sweep.  This spreadsheet was then forwarded to OIT 
personnel, who used it to plan patch updates.  My initial manual review of the 
first campus sweep took me approximately 17 hours.  After this first review, I 
created and began using the VB6 based .NSR parser which decreased the time 
it took to analyze a complete campus scan to just over an hour. 
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Figure 1.  Output from Nessus NSR Vulnerability Output Parser 
 
3.4.2.2  Nessus CLI Respawner (Shell Scripting).  When I first started to scan 
the ETSU network, I used a single Nessus job to scan for all known Nessus 
vulnerabilities.  I did not attempt multiple, concurrent scans of the network 
because of OIT concerns about the possible drain on the network’s bandwidth 
and the insistence that I only have use of one Nessus server.  These early scans, 
which took over 37 days to complete, used a now-obsolete version of Nessus 
that contained a client GUI memory leak that slowed large sweeps over time 
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[Deraison].  Since ETSU uses DHCP to dynamically allocate IP addresses to 
network hosts, the rate at which scans were completing was completely 
unacceptable as some machines could be missed or scanned twice if they 
were rebooted, depending on the new IP address they were given and the 
status of the current vulnerability sweep.  I also faced an almost unmanageable 
task of matching DHCP IP addresses to MAC addresses inside the .NSR data file 
to ensure that my report information did not include duplicate nodes. 
In an attempt to make these lengthy scans more manageable, I created 
a shell script that used a sequence of Nessus jobs to scan the network.  The 
script, which accepted a set of subnets to scan and a Nessusd configuration file 
as input, reduced the total network scan time to approximately 10 days.  The 
improvements in scan time resulted from the script’s practice of restarting the 
Nessus client prior to every subnet scan, thereby reducing the impact the 
memory leak in the Nessus GUI discussed above.  In subsequent scans, I used this 
shell script and customized configuration files to sweep the campus for specific, 
recently discovered or popular vulnerabilities or for the presence of remote 
administration applications such as BackOrifice and PCAnywhere. 
 
3.4.2.3  Remote TCP Service Monitor (VB6.0).  During one of my campus 
sweeps, the ETSU campus suffered a prolonged power outage, which required 
me to restart my scan when campus power was restored.  This incident exposed 
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a need for a supporting application that alerted me when the Nessus server quit 
operating.  I created an application that monitors activity on Nessus’ default 
port, 1241, on a user-specified server.  This application uses a config file to 
determine how to notify users when Nessus fails: e-mail, for example, is one of 
the supported options.  It has since been enhanced to monitor any TCP based 
service and supports text file logging, audible alerts, and remote database entry 
creation. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Remote TCP Service Monitor 
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Figure 3.  Remote TCP Service Monitor Options 
 
3.4.2.4  Localhost File Modification Watcher (VB.NET).  As a part of this 
research, I created a file modification watcher application and used it to check 
for evidence of compromise on a reportedly sluggish host.  A Nessus sweep of 
this host uncovered several vulnerabilities, and an Nmap port sweep revealed 
the presence of an application that was using a high numbered port to listen for 
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incoming connections.  Nmap, however, failed to name the offending 
application because of its high numbered port and obscurity and its failure to 
generate a banner.  To learn more about the anomaly, I created an application 
that displayed, in real time, the name of every file that was being accessed by a 
local file modification operation (created, deleted, renamed, etc.).  I then 
connected to the suspect port, using telnet, which triggered a local file 
modification, and used this information to locate the offending application.  This 
allowed me to determine that the host had been compromised using a recently 
disclosed Yahoo Instant Messenger stack overflow vulnerability, and was using 
an eggdrop IRC server.  
 
Figure 4.  Localhost File Modification Watcher 
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CHAPTER 4 
PROJECT HISTORY AND FINDINGS 
 
This chapter describes early events, initial lessons learned from the security 
hardening and remediation process, presents the study’s key conclusions, 
together with the evidence for these findings. 
 
4.1  Project History 
 
I started research and fieldwork for this master’s thesis on April 16, 2002 
when I met with my initial advisor, Dr. Phil Pfeiffer, and Mr. Bob Cook and Mr. 
Allan Baldwin of OIT to discuss project goals and logistics.  Dr. Pfeiffer 
represented the interests of the ETSU Computer Science department, and Bob 
Cook and Allan Baldwin represented the ETSU OIT.  Bob Cook would later 
become my direct supervisor during the project.  On April 17, I contacted James 
Ashe and gained access to his preliminary ETSU network security audit data.  On 
April 28, I met with Janet Keener, a manager from OIT User Services who was 
one of my main resources for contacting computer users.  Janet taught me how 
to use the ETSU computer user and equipment database application named 
REMEDY.  I concluded the initial phase of the work by reading the ETSU 
Acceptable User Policy, Code of Ethics, and a memo from Dr. Paul Stanton, 
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president of East Tennessee State University, to all university staff regarding 
computer network usage policy.   
Starting on May 14, I began spending two days a week on the ETSU 
campus working exclusively on fieldwork to collect data for my research.  As a 
network security novice, I initially needed to identify a set of tools to use for 
assessing network security.  The common tools for systems and network security 
auditing are applications and operating systems such as SSH, Linux, Nmap and 
Nessus [Top 50 Security Tools].  I gained valuable experience using and 
administering Nmap and Nessus, performed additional research on security 
trends, and started creating the supplemental applications described previously 
in this document. 
Once vulnerabilities were found, it was my job to coordinate the patching 
session with my OIT contacts.  I quickly discovered that liaison work for patch 
management represented another soft cost that I had failed to properly identify 
earlier in the research management process.  Professors often limit their contact 
hours to prescheduled office hours, during which they are often extremely busy.  
This increased the number of visits required per computer in order to obtain the 
expected approval for patching.  I attempted to limit visitation time by using e-
mail templates and multiple phone calls to schedule office visits when needed, 
but with only limited success.  Some users found it hard to imagine that their 
machine had been compromised and would question my methods and ask to 
speak to my direct supervisors.  While checking my credentials was an 
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understandable action, I found that, for some users, it was more of a “shoot the 
messenger” situation where I was being blamed for discovering the vulnerability 
or complete system compromise.   
I also found that some faculty members and students were using software 
firewalls to harden their own computers.  The use of software firewalls is a good 
practice, but it complicated scanning by severely increasing the time required 
to complete a scan.   It was easy to configure Nessus to fragment its scans to 
“drill” thru software firewalls.  Unfortunately, hosts with software firewalls routinely 
block IP pings.  Nessus ordinarily uses ping to determine whether a host is on the 
network before scanning it, as a way of avoiding the overhead of scanning IP 
addresses that are not assigned to an active host.  The use of fragmented 
Nessus scans increased the amount of time to complete the scan so much that 
OIT decided that default campus sweeps be configured to not fragment the 
vulnerability probes.  This allowed scans to finish early enough to be reviewed; 
however, any machine on the network that did not answer a ping request was 
not scanned for vulnerabilities.  Normally, machines with software firewalls are 
employed by power users who have a lower percentage of vulnerabilities on 
their own machines.  Still, this failure to scan all hosts is a risk that must be 
addressed if this research is repeated elsewhere and a complete security 
assessment is attempted. 
The applications I created for this research took approximately a month to 
design, develop, implement and test.  Scanning the ETSU network for all known 
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(to Nessus) vulnerabilities took, on average, 10 days.  The costs of patching 
vulnerabilities were the hardest to track, because other people did the work.  In 
most cases, it took two personnel contacts (via email or phone) to schedule a 
patch time, and approximately 10 minutes on site to download an update or 
modify an application configuration (per vulnerability found).  The complete 
contact and patch process generally took between 3 and 4 business days to 
complete. 
4.2 Findings 
The study’s primary findings about the challenges of network hardening 
can be divided into four categories:  challenges posed by the use of Nessus for 
large network scanning; challenges posed by the evolving nature of network 
services; challenges posed by the lack of user common sense in host and 
network management; and challenges posed by a lack of adequate support 
by high-level administration.   
 
4.2.1  On the Use of Nessus to Scan Large Networks 
 
  Single vulnerability scans (“go to guy scans”) of the 3,300 node ETSU 
network took approximately an hour and a half to complete, while complete 
sequential vulnerability scans took 10 days.  Fortunately, the Nessus vulnerability 
reporting engine allows nodes scanned to be identified by either IP address or 
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MAC address.  Using the unique MAC address to identify node vulnerability is 
suggested on large networks, as IP address reuse can be widespread in DHCP 
networks.  Based on the time it takes to scan a large network with one Nessus 
server, it is advised that vulnerability scanning be automated, and performed in 
parallel.  Had I been able to use multiple Nessus servers, say one on each subnet 
to perform the complete Nessus sweeps of campus, it would have taken an 
estimated 15 hours to complete versus the 240 it took using a single Nessus 
server.  Multiplying this difference (225) by the number of scans performed over 
the course of the research (39) yields an estimated time savings of 219 40-hour 
person-weeks (8775 hours). 
Automated parsers should also be used to summarize the vulnerability 
information inside NSR reports. The NSR parser cut the time needed to review a 
3,300 node vulnerability assessment from 17 hours to an hour.  Again, multiplying 
this difference (16) by the number of scans performed over the course of the 
research (39) yields an estimated time savings of 15½ 40-hour person-weeks (624 
hours).   
It is important to note that the described estimated time savings take 
place before a single user is contacted or patch is applied. 
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4.2.2  On the Effect of Service Evolution on Network Security Management 
 
The attempted elimination of unknown services across the ETSU 
administrative network was a secondary goal for this project.  The following 
chart shows a decrease in unknown non-critical (echo, qotd, chargen) servers 
on the ETSU campus from December 2002 to February 2004.  However, the 
overall number of services on the ETSU network increased over the course of the 
study.  I believe this increase reflects an emerging trend in the technology 
industry to package routers, switches, printers, PDAs and other devices with 
telnet, FTP and web server administrative front ends as a convenience to the 
end user.  This dramatic increase in administrative servers on campus, paired 
with common sense failures of not changing default or using simplistic 
passwords, represented an increasing bulk of “high” denoted vulnerabilities 
found on campus by each Nessus sweep. 
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SERVICE PORT SERVERS FOUND Change Over Time 
    12/02 4/03 2/04 diff 1/2 diff 2/3 diff 1/3 
Echo 7 64 47 39 -17 -8 -25
daytime 13 1 41 34 40 -7 33
Qotd 17 29 15 18 -14 3 -11
chargen 19 59 41 32 -18 -9 -27
ftp 21 188 195 251 7 56 63
Ssh 22 32 43 69 11 26 37
telnet 23 465 445 595 -20 150 130
Smtp 25 70 58 82 -12 24 12
Time 37 28 101 20 73 -81 -8
gopher 70 1 2 6 1 4 5
finger 79 0 47 41 47 -6 41
http 80 437 525 457 88 -68 20
pop3 110 17 7 23 -10 16 6
nntp 119 24 22 25 -2 3 1
Irc 194 0 0 4 0 4 4
https 443 86 81 142 -5 61 56
Doom 666 1 0 4 -1 4 3
sub7 1243 0 0 4 0 4 4
netbus 1245 0 0 5 0 5 5
netbus2 20034 2 0 4 -2 4 2
BackOrifice 31337 3 1 4 -2 3 1
 TOTAL 1507 1671 1859     
     AVG 7.8095 8.9524 16.7619
        TOTAL 164 188 352
 
Figure 5.  Service Trending Information, 12/2002 thru 2/2004 
 
4.2.3  On the Common Sense of Users and Support Personnel 
 
The initial vulnerability sweep of the campus network identified 15 
accounts that used null or extremely simplistic passwords.  These accounts 
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included default install accounts still using their default password such as the 
SQL Server administrative account “sa” using the null password, and simplistic 
common passwords such as “admin”, “administrator”, “root”, or “password”.  
These common sense failures, on the part of both normal, non-technical users 
and the information technology support staff, present security vulnerabilities that 
could be mitigated with the enforced use of properly devised security policies 
and procedures. 
 
4.2.4  On the Criticality of Obtaining and Retaining Administrative Support 
 
Administrative support was one of the most influential factors in 
completing this research, and one that I initially overlooked.  Over the course of 
this study, I was repeatedly forced to abandon straightforward strategies for 
network hardening, due to management-imposed restrictions on my ability to 
access the network.   
Initially, I intended to sweep the ETSU campus for all vulnerabilities that I 
could find and patch them immediately.  This strategy failed due to the sheer 
size of the campus network and the extreme amount of time it required to 
complete a full campus sweep.  I had hoped to use multiple Nessus servers to 
decrease the amount of time it would take to perform the full vulnerability 
sweep, but the request was denied by OIT management due to the network 
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bandwidth each sweep was using and their allotment of only one machine to 
use for this research. 
I then tried to sweep the campus building by building (most buildings on 
the ETSU campus are their own subnet) and patch the vulnerabilities found.  This 
required me to have a domain level administration account to easily patch any 
machine on campus, and was also denied by OIT management due to my 
student enrollment status and lack of full-time employment within the OIT 
support organization (I was an employee of the university, but in the computer 
science department).   
Finally, I decided to sweep the campus for one vulnerability at a time (or 
a handful at the most), in order from the worst vulnerabilities that Nessus looked 
for to the least dangerous ones.  Once I identified a set of vulnerabilities, I 
relayed the information to the OIT staff, and they applied the available patch.  
Typical OIT response time was between one and three days, depending on the 
vulnerability criticality, the management driven security motivation that month, 
and the current workload of OIT personnel. 
In addition to the time required to research and develop the procedures, I 
devoted far more time than I had anticipated to human concerns that arose 
during the course of routine system management.  The extent, importance, and 
difficulty of this “soft” work, which mounted from day one, were largely 
overlooked in my initial planning for the project.  The work included, but not 
limited to, personal interactions with faculty, staff and students about fixing 
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vulnerabilities I found on their machines, staying current on breaking vulnerability 
data, and dealing with various challenges presented by OIT management of 
the project. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter summarizes the work performed and presents final 
recommendations and the eventual actions taken by site management based 
on the data presented in this document. 
 
5.1  General Observations 
 
My research on network security evolved over time, in response to 
obstacles created by university policies for computer administration.  Originally, I 
had intended to track security costs involving application design, development, 
and testing, vulnerability scanning times, physical patching or performing 
security hardening exercises, and administrative-project management time.  As 
the constraints on my research changed, so did the goals for the thesis, and the 
strategies used to achieve them. 
I did not anticipate how hard and time consuming it would be to 
administer and manage the entire research process myself.  This effort, in part, 
involved teaching myself how to perform research.  I attempted to alleviate 
administrative headaches, in part, by tracking the work performed and setting 
goals for each day or week.  This allowed me to break the project into “baby 
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steps” that I could easily perform each day or week to continue to work towards 
the final goal.  One of the work logs I created (and supplied OIT administration 
and my thesis committee) is shown in appendix D.1. 
As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, automating sweeps and data analysis 
did much to streamline the work of research.  While automation is a network 
administrative best practice, nonetheless it surprised me that I saved over 26 
days in pure scan time, and over 16 hours in scan analysis per campus sweep by 
automating tasks using the applications I created for this research.  These 
particular cost savings were only possible because of my ability to rapidly create 
shell scripts and applications as needed, in multiple development environments. 
The original goal of determining the amount of time needed to apply 
patches to vulnerable machines was not met, due in part to OIT’s policy of 
limiting the work of system patching to full-time OIT employees.  In retrospect, 
changes in ETSU’s procedures for administering the campus network that were 
instituted near the end of this project would have rendered any data gathered 
during the first part of the project moot.  In April 2004, OIT rolled out a centralized 
patch management system which largely eliminated the need for visiting a 
machine to apply patches.  Microsoft Software Update Services (SUS) is an 
administration tool that allows domain administrators access to control the 
‘Automatic Updates’ control panel object in Windows 2000, Windows XP and 
Windows 2003 systems.  This allowed the OIT staff to test and automate patch 
application campus wide and not have to visit each machine. 
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5.2  Specific Recommendations for Maintaining Network Security 
 
My review of the data generated by the year-long security audit, 
including all vulnerabilities and challenges encountered, yielded the following 
recommendations for hardening the ETSU administrative network:  
 
• Confirm that the latest operating system and application patches are 
installed.  In most cases, security updates and application fixes are 
incorporated into operating system patches and are available from the 
OS vendor.  Starting with Windows 2000 Service Pack 3, Microsoft 
operating systems can be configured to automatically download critical 
operating system updates to reduce administration network 
management strain and massive failure due to a new malicious virus or 
worm.  Similarly, Red Hat Linux operating systems can also be configured 
with a crontab entry using the up2date application bundled with the OS 
to keep the operating system updated.  Keeping these operating systems 
updated automatically is fairly simple to set up; however keeping 
applications and services up to date is a task which still must be 
performed manually by support personnel. 
 
• Disable unused or unneeded services.  This will reduce the number of entry 
points into systems and reduce the number of security holes created by 
newly discovered vulnerabilities.  If a particular service is not enabled, no 
one can use it to compromise your systems or network. 
 
 52 
• Install Anti-Virus Software and Updates.  It is imperative to install anti-virus 
software on all workstations and servers and keep them up-to-date with 
the latest virus signatures.  
 
• Ensure system Administrator accounts have a strong password.  The 
Administrator account's password should be at least 9 characters long 
and include at least 1 punctuation mark OR non-printing ASCII character 
within the first 7 characters. In addition, the Administrator account 
password should not be synchronized across multiple servers.  Different 
passwords should be used on each server to raise the level of security in 
the workgroup or domain based on the standard defined in the network 
security policy. 
 
• Disable guest accounts. 
 
• Create a position or assign an existing OIT network administrator or analyst 
a recurring duty of scanning the network for vulnerabilities and patching 
systems as needed.  I feel that the results of the sweeps I performed 
clearly indicate that this is a necessity. 
 
Upon completion of this research, the previous points were submitted and 
discussed with OIT support personnel.  Those suggestions, paired with the 
vulnerability data and service permeation data obtained during this research, 
motivated OIT management to pursue the previously described centralized 
patch management system and automated patch installation scheduler.  The 
implementation of a campus firewall and a subsequent hardening of the 
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inbound/outbound traffic rules on this firewall allowed OIT management to 
control the type and amount of traffic allowed in and out of the campus 
network on a port-by-port basis.  The current firewall configuration allows only 
incoming access to the campus for specific subnets and servers, and allows 
outbound traffic only on specified ports for most of the campus. 
The firewall configuration and implementation addresses most 
vulnerability concerns detailed by this research when considering attacks from 
outside the campus.  This results from the traffic being blocked because of a 
firewall access rule or parameter, thereby limiting the avenues into the ETSU 
network from outside campus.  However, this still leaves certain ports open and 
available for avenues of attack (e.g., HTTP port 80, and some internally 
originated traffic based vulnerabilities).  This also leaves a host of viable attack 
avenues for malicious users inside the campus firewall, who can footprint all 
ports and services on campus to create their own vulnerability exploit list.  
Because of the limitations of the current implementation of the campus firewall, 
continued vulnerability assessment sweeps, similar to those detailed in this 
document, are suggested for the ETSU computer network. 
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APPENDIX A:  TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
* A * 
 
Availability: The amount of time a computer system or network is 
available for normal business use.  Availability is very 
important in interpreting the total cost of ownership of a 
security model. 
 
* B * 
 
Banner 
Enumeration: The process of sweeping a port range looking for service 
banners. 
 
Banner 
Recognition: The process of parsing a service banner to retrieve 
application version or patch level information. 
 
Black Box: A vulnerability assessment strategy where the test team has 
no knowledge of the underlying network infrastructure. 
 
Blog:   Web log or binary log.  An online journal. 
  
* C * 
 
CHARGEN: A UNIX utility that sends random characters over a network. 
 
CGI: Common Gateway Interface – A specification that allows a 
server-side executable to accept and manipulate data given 
from a web page. 
 
Crystal Box: A vulnerability assessment strategy where the test team has 
some knowledge of the underlying network infrastructure. 
 
* D *  
 
Day-0: The time between a vulnerability being discovered and a fix 
being released. 
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DDoS: Distributed Denial of Service (attack) – an attack launched 
by multiple computers against a host that blocks a large 
percentage of legitimate network traffic from entering the 
host network or system. 
 
Defense-in- 
Depth: A security strategy using multiple layers or types of “security 
solutions”. 
 
DHCP: Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol – a protocol used for 
automatically assigning dynamic IP addresses to network 
clients. 
 
DoS: Denial of Service – an attack launched by a single computer 
against a host that causes a failure in the host that denies 
services.  
 
* E * 
 
Echo:   A utility used to display a line of text on a screen. 
 
Eggdrop:  An open-source IRC robot. 
 
Enumeration: The characterization of a computer or network level 
accounts and open shares, via probes of said system(s). 
 
ETSU: East Tennessee State University - a regional university located 
in Johnson City, Tennessee. 
 
* F *  
 
Firewall: A hardware or software boundary between connecting 
networks.  Typically used to filter incoming packets based on 
specific rule sets. 
 
Footprint: An attempt to profile an organization’s network security 
structure.  The increased knowledge is generally used for 
attempted intrusion. 
 
Finger:  A utility used to retrieve information about a remote user. 
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FTP: File Transfer Protocol, a method of transmitting files from one 
computer to another. 
 
* H * 
 
HTML: HyperText Markup Language, a computer language used to 
create world wide web pages. 
 
HTTP: HyperText Transfer Protocol, the protocol used by the World 
Wide Web for transferring data between web servers and 
web browsers. 
 
* I * 
 
IRC: Internet Relay Chat – an online system used for 
communications and file transfer. 
 
IP: Internet Protocol – a connectionless protocol used to deliver 
packets of information between two, or more, systems on a 
network. Paired with the Transport Control Protocol to create 
TCP/IP, the main protocol used on the Internet and local area 
networks. 
 
* L *  
 
LAN: Local Area Network -- A data communications network 
confined to a limited geographic area with moderate to high 
data rates.  The area served may consist of a single building 
or a cluster of buildings.  It is owned by its user, and does not 
use common carrier circuits.  LANs may have gateways or 
bridges to other public or private networks. 
 
* N * 
 
Nessus: A freeware UNIX tool that scans systems on a network to 
discover “well-known” security vulnerabilities. 
 
Nessus 
Attack 
Scripting 
Language: A scripting language developed for the Nessus vulnerability 
scanner. 
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NetBIOS: Network Basic Input/Output System.  A network API 
developed by IBM and Sytek. 
 
Nmap: A freeware UNIX tool that determines open ports within a 
network protocol stack. 
 
* O * 
 
OIT:   Office of Information Technology. 
  
* P *  
 
Packet: A group of bits, including information bits and overhead bits, 
transmitted as a complete package on a packet-switched 
network.  Usually smaller than a transmission block. 
 
Password: A secret code known by the computer system for a specific 
user or program.  Passwords are used for authentication, not 
authorization. 
 
Physical 
Security: An application of physical barriers or control procedures to 
protect information systems. 
 
Plug-in: A small piece of software that enriches a larger piece of 
software by adding additional functionality. 
 
Port: A computer interface used for communicating with a remote 
terminal. 
 
Protocol: A set of methods or procedures that govern the transmission 
of data. 
 
Protocol 
Analyzer: An application used to passively monitor traffic on a network. 
 
* R *  
 
Red Hat Linux: A Linux distribution Operating System. 
 
Remote Access:  The act of connecting to a network by remote means.  
Usually performed via telephone lines or the Internet. 
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Rootkit: A collection of trojaned processes and scripts that automate 
common hacker actions performed after successfully 
compromising a system. 
 
Router: A protocol specific device that passes data between LANs by 
examining the data and selecting the cheapest, fastest, or 
least busy of all available routes.  It functions at the network 
layer of the OSI model. 
 
* S* 
 
Script Kiddie: A hacker who lacks the skill to unleash an attack of his or her 
own and thus uses prewritten scripts to perform the attack. 
 
SMB: Server Message Block.  A Microsoft protocol developed to 
enable file and print sharing on a network. 
 
Sniffing: The act of monitoring or recording packet traffic across a 
network for later review.  Usually used to acquire login 
information, or as a maintenance or diagnostic tool for 
administrators. 
 
Subnet: A portion of a network distinguished by a number or range of 
addresses.  
 
* T * 
 
TCP: Transport Control Protocol – a connection-based protocol 
that enables two system to communicate with streams of 
information.  Paired with the Internet Protocol to create 
TCP/IP, the main protocol used on the Internet and local area 
networks. 
 
Telnet: A program/protocol used to connect and interact with a 
remote host to perform operations as if the remote host were 
local. 
 
Trojan Horse: A program that, when activated, has unexpected side 
effects.  These side effects are usually masked or otherwise 
hidden from the user such as opening backdoors into the 
associated computer or attached network. 
 
* U * 
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UDP: User Datagram Protocol – a connectionless protocol used 
mainly in broadcast delivery of packets. 
 
* V *  
 
Virtual Security: The task of securing information stored in, transmitted through 
or accessed by a computer using on-line commands 
 
 
Virus: A computer application that has self replicating code or 
characteristics.  Virii are generally thought of as being 
disruptive, although many widely accepted applications 
exhibit this attribute. 
 
Vulnerability: A flaw in a program’s configuration or logic that allows an 
attacker to receive escalated privileges, disable application 
or service operation or compromise computer data 
 
Vulnerability 
Remediation: The processes involved when patching a known vulnerability.  
This can include, but is not limited to file permission 
modification, policy creation or modification, installing a 
patch or hot fix. 
 
* W * 
 
Worm: A computer application that replicates itself until it uses all 
available resources of a computer or network.  A worm differs 
from a virus in that a worm is not embedded in another 
application. 
 
* Z * 
 
Zombie: A PC which has been previously compromised and is now 
under the control of a hacker.  Used in tandem with other 
zombies to deploy a Distributed Denial of Service style attack. 
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APPENDIX B:  CREATED SOURCE CODES 
 
Nessus CLI Respawner (Shell script) 
 
This shell script was used to automate campus sweeps by allowing a Nessus 
configuration file and host list be specified on the command line with the rest of 
the batch scan information.  It creates a status output file which can be 
accessed in real time to determine the point of the sweep it is currently in. 
 
#!/bin/bsh 
#thesisScanner script to automate campus sweep with a predefined config file. 
#input – campusNets (text file of campus subnet ranges to scan, <cr> limited) 
#input -- .nessusAll (nessus config file to scan with) 
#output – progress (text file with text progress indicators) 
 
#variable declarations  
nessConf='/root/thesis/ness_cmd/.nessusAll' 
numNessTargets=$(wc –l /root/thesis/ness_cmd/campusNets) 
strTarget='nothing' 
strFilename='nothing' 
numIterator=1 
 
echo 'STARTING SWEEP' > progress 
 
$SUDO killall nessusd 
$SUDO killall nessus 
$SUDO /usr/local/sbin/nessusd -D 
 
#recursion for the target file ... 
until test $numIterator -ge $numNessTargets; do 
 
  $(head -n $numIterator campusNets | tail -n 1 > targetFile) strTarget=$(head –n 
$numIterator campusNets | tail -n 1)  
 
  echo 'Scanning Target:' $(cat targetFile) '(pass:'$numIterator')' 
  echo 'Scanning Target:' $(cat targetFile) '(pass:'$numIterator')' >> progress 
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  strFilename=$(head -c 10 targetFile) 
 
  #scan the target subnet here 
  nessus -c $nessConf -T nsr -q localhost 1241 root [PASSWORD] targetFile 
$strFilename.nsr 
 
  #kill all nessus & nessusd processes (memory cleanup hopefully) 
  echo 'Killing all nessus clients and daemons ...'  
  echo 'Killing all nessus clients and daemons ...' >> progress 
  $SUDO killall nessusd $SUDO killall nessus  
  echo 'Finished killing all nessus clients and daemons.' 
 
  #restart nessus daemon for next pass 
  echo 'Restarting Nessus Daemon ...' 
  echo 'Restarting Nessus Daemon ...' >> progress 
  $SUDO /usr/local/sbin/nessusd -D 
  echo 'Nessus Daemon Restarted.' 
 
  let numIterator=numIterator+1 
done 
 
$SUDO killall nessusd 
$SUDO killall nessus 
 
echo 'thesisScanner.sh sweep is complete!' >> progress 
 
$SUDO service sendmail start 
cat progress | mail –s “thesisScanner complete” zwrs2@imail.etsu.edu 
$SUDO service sendmail stop 
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 Nessus Log Parser (VB6 and VBA) 
 
This VB6 and VBA embedded Excel application is used to parse raw Nessus .nsr 
vulnerability information files and create a vulnerability matrix of hosts.  It 
decreases the vulnerability data review time required after a successful 
vulnerability sweep. 
 
'frmTest Form 
Option Explicit 
Private objNessus As prjNessus.clsNessus 
 
Private Sub cmdProcess_Click() 
    ' 
    '   OK 
    '   You have to set the delimiter and the filename to decode before calling 
the decode method 
    '   (crashes gracefully if you don't) 
    ' 
    objNessus.Delimter = "|" 
    objNessus.FileName = VerifyFile("123", Me) 
    objNessus.DecodeFile 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub Form_Load() 
    Set objNessus = New prjNessus.clsNessus 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub Form_Terminate() 
    ' 
    '   *** Be sure and do this 
    ' 
    Set objNessus = Nothing 
End Sub 
 
'--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Public Function VerifyFile(str As String, frm As Form) As String 
'============================================================= 
' Module1.VerifyFile 
'------------------------------------------------------------- 
' Purpose : Verifys that file exist, if not, it display of 
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'           dialog box to let the user find the file. 
' Notes : 
'------------------------------------------------------------- 
' Parameters 
'----------- 
'   str As String - File name to verify 
'   frm as From - Form procedure is called from (use Me) 
'------------------------------------------------------------- 
' Returns: 
'   String - File name and path of new file to be opened 
'------------------------------------------------------------- 
' Revision History 
'   11/25/2000 - Added error checking to take care of user 
'                selecting the cancel button 
'------------------------------------------------------------- 
'============================================================= 
' End Code Header block 
 On Error GoTo ErrorHandler 
    If Dir(str) = "" Then 
        ' 
        '   *** File does not exist 
        ' 
        '----------------- 
        frm.dlgCommon.CancelError = True 
        frm.dlgCommon.FileName = "" 
        frm.dlgCommon.Filter = "Nessus Files (*.nsr)|*.nsr|All Files (*.*)|*.*" 
        frm.dlgCommon.InitDir = App.Path 
        frm.dlgCommon.ShowOpen 
        VerifyFile = frm.dlgCommon.FileName 
    Else 
        ' 
        '   *** If file does exist 
        ' 
        VerifyFile = str 
    End If 
    Exit Function 
     
ErrorHandler: 
    ' 
    '   *** Error 32755 occurs when cancel is selected from the dialog box 
    ' 
    If Err.Number = 32755 Then 
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        MsgBox "No File was selected, the application will now close", vbOKOnly + 
vbExclamation, "File required" 
'        End 
'    Else 
'        DisplayError 
    End If 
End Function 
 
 
'clsNessus Class 
Option Explicit 
Private strDelim As String 
Private intKeys As Integer 
Private strFileName As String 
 
Private Const conErrNoDelim As String = "No delimiter has been set, must set 
obj.Delimiter" 
Private Const conErrNoDelimNumber As Integer = 2000 
Private Const conErrNoDelimSource = "prjNessus.clsNessus: Delimiter Property" 
 
Private Const conErrNoFile As String = "No Filename was given to decode." 
Private Const conErrNoFileNumber As Integer = 2001 
Private Const conErrNoFileSource As String = "obj.FileName" 
 
Dim objExcel As New Excel.Application 
Dim objBook As Excel.Workbook 
Dim objSheet As Excel.Worksheet 
Dim objSheet2 As Excel.Worksheet 
 
 
Public Sub DecodeFile() 
    Dim objFile As New Scripting.FileSystemObject 
    Dim fsStream As Scripting.TextStream 
    Dim strLine As Variant 
    Dim strReadLine As String 
    Dim intX As Integer 
    Dim strKeys As Variant 
    Dim intRow As Integer 
     
    Set objBook = objExcel.Workbooks.Add 
    Set objSheet = objBook.Worksheets.Add 
   ' Set objBook = GetObject(App.Path & "\original.xls") 
    Set objSheet2 = objBook.Worksheets.Add 
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    objSheet2.Name = "Nessus Info " & Format(Date, "dddd.mmm d yyyy") 
    objSheet.Name = "Data Dump" 
     
    On Error GoTo ErrHandler 
     
        
    If strDelim = vbNullString Then Err.Raise vbObjectError + conErrNoDelimNumber, 
conErrNoDelimSource, conErrNoDelim 
    If strFileName = vbNullString Then Err.Raise vbObjectError + 
conErrNoFileNumber, conErrNoFileSource, conErrNoFile 
     
    Set fsStream = objFile.OpenTextFile(strFileName) 
     
    ''' check for no keys number 
    intRow = 3 
    objSheet2.Cells(1, 1) = "Nessus ID" 
    objSheet2.Cells(1, 2) = "Name" 
    objSheet2.Cells(1, 3) = "Family" 
    objSheet2.Cells(1, 4) = "Summary" 
    objSheet2.Cells(1, 5) = "Port(s)" 
    objSheet2.Cells(1, 6) = Date 
    objSheet2.Cells.Font.Bold = True 
    objSheet2.Cells.Font.Color = vbBlack 
     
    Dim intMax As Integer 
     
    Do 
        strReadLine = fsStream.ReadLine 
        strLine = Split(strReadLine, strDelim) 
        intMax = NumOfReturnValues(strReadLine) 
         
        If 2 <= intMax Then objSheet2.Cells(intRow, 1) = strLine(2) 
        If 0 <= intMax Then 
            objSheet2.Cells(intRow, 2) = strLine(0) 
            If 2 <= intMax Then objSheet2.Hyperlinks.Add objSheet2.Cells(intRow, 2), 
"http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?id=" & strLine(2) 
        End If 
         
        If 3 <= intMax Then 
            objSheet2.Cells(intRow, 3) = strLine(3) 
            objSheet2.Hyperlinks.Add objSheet2.Cells(intRow, 3), 
"http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?family=" & strLine(3) 
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        End If 
         
        If 4 <= intMax Then objSheet2.Cells(intRow, 4) = strLine(4) 
        If 5 <= intMax Then objSheet2.Cells(intRow, 5) = strLine(5) 
                 
        For intX = 0 To NumOfReturnValues(strReadLine) 
            'Debug.Print strLine(intX) 
            objSheet.Cells(intRow, intX + 1) = strLine(intX) 
            'objSheet2.Cells(intRow, intX + 1) = strLine(intX) 
 
        Next intX 
         
'        Debug.Print "---------"         
        ' 
        '   *** Parse line 
        ' 
        ' 0 = Host 
        ' 1 = Port 
        ' 2 = Nessus ID 
        ' 3 = Family (type) 
        ' 4 = Summary 
         
        intRow = intRow + 1 
    Loop While Not fsStream.AtEndOfStream 
 
    objSheet2.Columns.AutoFit 
    objSheet.Columns.AutoFit 
    objExcel.Visible = True 
     
    Exit Sub 
ErrHandler: 
    MsgBox Err.Number & vbNewLine & Err.Description & vbNewLine & "Source: " & 
Err.Source, vbCritical, Err.Source 
End Sub 
 
Public Function NumOfReturnValues(strData As String) As Integer 
    Dim intCount As Integer 
    Dim intVal As Integer 
     
    intVal = 1 
    Do Until intVal = 0 
        intVal = InStr(intVal + 1, strData, strDelim, vbBinaryCompare) 
        intCount = intCount + 1         
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    Loop 
     
    NumOfReturnValues = intCount - 1 
End Function 
 
' 
'   *** Set delimiter for parser 
' 
Public Property Let Delimter(ByVal strDelimiter As String) 
    strDelim = strDelimiter 
End Property 
 
' 
'   *** Set filename to decode 
' 
Public Property Let FileName(ByVal strNewFileName As String) 
    strFileName = strNewFileName 
End Property 
 
Private Sub Class_Terminate() 
    Set objSheet = Nothing 
    Set objSheet2 = Nothing 
    Set objBook = Nothing 
    Set objExcel = Nothing 
End Sub 
 
'------------------------------------------------------------------- 
'-------------------------- SET Nessus URL  ------------------------- 
'------------------------------------------------------------------- 
'   Programmer:         Rick Simons 
'   E-mail address:     zwrs2@imail.etsu.edu 
'   Creation date:        5/23/02 
'   Date of last mod:   9/17/02 
'------------------------------------------------------------------- 
'------------------------------------------------------------------- 
'   Purpose: 
'------------------------------------------------------------------- 
'------------------------------------------------------------------- 
'   Notes: 
'------------------------------------------------------------------- 
'------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Option Explicit 
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Public Function setNessusURL() 
    Dim astrURL As String 
    Dim astrNessusID As String 
    Dim astrIsLastRow As String 
    Dim aLAST_COLUMN As String 
    Dim aFIRST_COLUMN As String 
    Dim acolumn As String 
    Dim r As Integer 
     
    aFIRST_COLUMN = "C" 
    aLAST_COLUMN = "Y" 
    acolumn = "C" 
    Dim start As Integer 
    start = 64 
     
    For r = 1 To 30 
        astrURL = "http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?id=" 
        astrNessusID = (Range(acolumn & 4).Value) 
         
        With Worksheets(1) 
            Hyperlinks.Add Anchor:=.Range(acolumn & 4), _ 
                Address:=astrURL & astrNessusID, _ 
                TextToDisplay:=astrNessusID 
        End With 
 
        ‘these nested ifs are nasty, but I don’t have time to write a clean  
        ‘ function atm, need to cleanup later 
        If acolumn = "X" Then acolumn = "Y" 
        If acolumn = "W" Then acolumn = "X" 
        If acolumn = "V" Then acolumn = "W" 
        If acolumn = "U" Then acolumn = "V" 
        If acolumn = "T" Then acolumn = "U" 
        If acolumn = "S" Then acolumn = "T" 
        If acolumn = "R" Then acolumn = "S" 
        If acolumn = "Q" Then acolumn = "R" 
        If acolumn = "P" Then acolumn = "Q" 
        If acolumn = "O" Then acolumn = "P" 
        If acolumn = "N" Then acolumn = "O" 
        If acolumn = "M" Then acolumn = "N" 
        If acolumn = "L" Then acolumn = "M" 
        If acolumn = "K" Then acolumn = "L" 
        If acolumn = "J" Then acolumn = "K" 
        If acolumn = "I" Then acolumn = "J" 
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        If acolumn = "H" Then acolumn = "I" 
        If acolumn = "G" Then acolumn = "H" 
        If acolumn = "F" Then acolumn = "G" 
        If acolumn = "E" Then acolumn = "F" 
        If acolumn = "D" Then acolumn = "E" 
        If acolumn = "C" Then acolumn = "D" 
    Next 
End Function 
 
'------------------------------------------------------------------- 
'-------------------------- SET Nessus IDs  ------------------------- 
'------------------------------------------------------------------- 
'   Programmer:         Rick Simons 
'   E-mail address:     zwrs2@imail.etsu.edu 
'   Creation date:      5/23/02 
'   Date of last mod:   9/17/02 
'------------------------------------------------------------------- 
'------------------------------------------------------------------- 
'   Purpose: 
'------------------------------------------------------------------- 
'------------------------------------------------------------------- 
'   Notes: 
'------------------------------------------------------------------- 
'------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Option Explicit 
Public Sub setNessusIDS() 
    Dim MAX_ROWS As Integer     ' for the max rows in the sheet 
(ROGERSTOUT."Nessus Info") 
    Dim LAST_ROW As Integer 
    Dim r As Integer            ' these are iterators for parsing the document fully 
    Dim strURL As String 
    Dim strNessusID As String 
    Dim strIsLastRow As String 
 
    MAX_ROWS = 1096              ' current nessusID max is 1095 on 9.17.02, need to 
make this global 
    LAST_ROW = 1096 
    For r = 2 To LAST_ROW 
        strURL = Range("b" & r).Hyperlinks(1).Name 
        strNessusID = Right(strURL, 5) 
        Range("a" & r).Value = strNessusID 
    Next 
End Sub 
 72 
 Remote TCP Service Monitor (VB6) 
 
This application is used to remotely monitor TCP based servers and notify support 
personnel if the server fails. 
  
'------------------------------------------------------------------- 
'---------------------------- Service Mon -------------------------- 
'------------------------------------------------------------------- 
'   Programmers:  Rick Simons 
' Creation Date:  11.30.03                      Last Mod:   12.13.03 
'------------------------------------------------------------------- 
'    Purpose:  To effectively monitor TCP services like FTP, SSH, 
'              Telnet, HTTP, HTTPS, MS-SQL, MS-MsgQueue, etc. 
'------------------------------------------------------------------- 
'      Notes:  Base TCP connect code and logic was ripped from 
'              HotMon 1.0 found @  
'              http://www.planetsourcecode.com/ 
'                  vb/scripts/ShowCode.asp?txtCodeId=9057&lngWId=1 
'   
'              The email notify junk was based on a smtp/rfc 
'              spec review and is kinda nasty.  Canned email 
'       object from MSN doesn’t handle relay very well, 
'       so this is very raw command driven MTA/MX. 
'------------------------------------------------------------------- 
'       ToDo:  Need to add the following functionality when 
'              time permits: 
' 
'                GUI:   Add/Edit/Delete host/port to monitor 
' 
'                Logic: Add DNS resolution for IP based hosts 
'                Logic: Add additional error handling 
'                       - DNS resolution failure 
'                       - additional TCP handshake cases (RFC) 
'                       - error on email/sql/log 
' 
'                Proj:  Convert to .NET 
'                Proj:  Convert to service 
'------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Option Explicit 
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Dim sIPAddress As String 
Dim sLastState As String 
Dim sSubj As String 
Dim sBody As String 
Dim sAppVersion As String 
Dim sHost As String 
Dim iPort As Integer 
Dim iPortNumber As Integer 
Dim iTimerIterator As Integer 
 
Enum States 
  Start = -1 
  Connect 
  Helo 
  MailFrom 
  SendTo 
  Data 
  MessageData 
  EndMessage 
  Complete 
End Enum 
 
Dim State As States 
 
Private Sub cmdOptions_Click() 
  frmOptions.Show 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub Form_Load() 
  sIPAddress = 0 
  iPortNumber = 1 
  sLastState = 2 
  sHost = frmOptions.txtEmailServer.Text 
  iPort = frmOptions.txtEmailPort.Text 
  sAppVersion = App.Major & "." & App.Minor & App.Revision 
 
  StatusBar1.Panels.Item(1).Text = "Service Mon v" & sAppVersion 
   
  'this cannot have spaces, per smtp rfc spec 
  frmOptions.txtEmailFrom.Text = "ServiceMon_v" & sAppVersion 
   
  grdStatus.ColAlignment(sIPAddress) = flexAlignLeftCenter 
  grdStatus.ColAlignment(sLastState) = flexAlignCenterCenter 
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  grdStatus.ColWidth(0) = 1875 
  grdStatus.ColWidth(1) = 600 
  grdStatus.ColWidth(2) = 1875 
  grdStatus.Row = 0 
  grdStatus.Col = 0 
  grdStatus.Text = "Host" 
  grdStatus.Col = 1 
  grdStatus.Text = "Port" 
  grdStatus.Col = 2 
  grdStatus.Text = "State" 
  grdStatus.SelectionMode = flexSelectionByRow 
 
  LoadConfig 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub cmdMonitor_Click() 
  cmdExit.Enabled = False 
  iTimerIterator = 1 
   
  If cmdMonitor.Caption = "&Monitor" Then 
    StatusBar1.Panels.Item(1).Text = "Monitoring Services ..." 
    StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "" 
     
    'couldn't figure out how to overload timer obj to take a long, so 
    'hacked a nasty iterator to cause it to push monitor every blah iterations. 
    '60000 =  60 seconds...iterator mux is in frmOptions 
    Timer1.Interval = 60000 
     
    Timer1.Enabled = True 
    cmdMonitor.Caption = "&Stop" 
    LogEvent "Service Mon v" & sAppVersion & " Started." 
    Monitor 
  Else 
    Timer1.Enabled = False 
    cmdMonitor.Caption = "&Monitor" 
    StatusBar1.Panels.Item(1).Text = "Service Mon v" & App.Major & "." & App.Minor 
& App.Revision 
    StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "" 
    StatusBar1.Panels.Item(3).Text = "" 
     
    If grdStatus.Enabled = False Then 
      grdStatus.Enabled = True 
    Else 
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      'do nothing 
    End If 
    cmdExit.Enabled = True 
    cmdOptions.Enabled = True 
  End If 
End Sub 
 
'This is the Winsock monitoring code 
Private Sub Monitor() 
  Dim RowPos As Integer 
  Dim sService As String 
  Dim sTemp As String 
   
  grdStatus.Enabled = False 
  cmdOptions.Enabled = False 
 
  For RowPos = 1 To grdStatus.Rows - 1 
    If sckMonitor.State <> 0 Then 
      sckMonitor.Close 
    Else 
      'do nothing 
    End If 
       
    grdStatus.Col = sIPAddress 
    grdStatus.Row = RowPos 
    sckMonitor.RemoteHost = grdStatus.Text 
    grdStatus.Col = iPortNumber 
    sckMonitor.RemotePort = Val(grdStatus.Text) 
    sckMonitor.Connect 
    grdStatus.Col = sIPAddress 
 
    While sckMonitor.State = 4 
      DoEvents 
      If sckMonitor.State = 5 Then 
        'StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "Resolved" 
      Else 
        'do nothing 
      End If 
    Wend 
 
    While sckMonitor.State = 6 
      'StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "Connecting ..." 
      DoEvents 
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    Wend 
 
    Select Case sckMonitor.State 
      Case 0: 
        StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "Closed" 
      Case 1: 
        grdStatus.Col = sLastState 
        grdStatus.Text = "  UP! (1)" 
        grdStatus.Col = sIPAddress 
        'StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "ALIVE! (1)" 
      Case 2: 
        'StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "Listening" 
      Case 3: 
        'StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "Pending" 
      Case 4: 
        'StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "Resolving" 
      Case 5: 
        'StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "Resolved" 
      Case 6: 
        'StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "Connecting" 
        While sckMonitor.State = 6 
          DoEvents 
        Wend 
      Case 7: 
        grdStatus.Col = sLastState 
        grdStatus.Text = "  UP! (7)" 
        grdStatus.Col = sIPAddress 
        'StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "Connected" 
        'StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "ALIVE! (7)" 
      Case 8: 
        StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "Closing" 
      Case 9: 
        grdStatus.Col = sLastState 
        grdStatus.Text = "DOWN! (9)" 
        grdStatus.Col = sIPAddress 
        StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = grdStatus.Text & " DOWN! (9)" 
        grdStatus.Col = grdStatus.Col + 1 
        sTemp = grdStatus.Text 
        grdStatus.Col = grdStatus.Col - 1 
        LogEvent grdStatus.Text & " " & sTemp & " is DOWN! (9)" 
        sSubj = "" 
        sSubj = grdStatus.Text 
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        grdStatus.Col = grdStatus.Col + 1 
         
        'doing this for default port service associations.  for monitoring a service 
        'running on a "defined" port,  
'ToDo:  need to hack this or write a banner recognition parser 
        Select Case grdStatus.Text 
          Case 21 
            sService = "FTP-21" 
          Case 22 
            sService = "SSH-22" 
          Case 23 
            sService = "TELNET-23" 
          Case 25 
            sService = "SMTP-25" 
          Case 79 
            sService = "FINGER-79" 
          Case 80 
            sService = "HTTP-80" 
          Case 443 
            sService = "HTTPS-443" 
          Case 444 
            sService = "HTTPS-444" 
          Case 1241 
            sService = “NESSUSD-1241” 
          Case 1433 
            sService = "MS SQL-1433" 
          Case 1801 
            sService = "MS MESSENGING QUEUE-1801" 
          Case 2601 
            sService = "RS RDP-2601" 
          Case 3389 
            sService = "MS TERM SERV/RD-3389" 
          Case 5901 - 5909 
            sService = "VNC SERVER-5901-09" 
          Case Else 
            sService = grdStatus.Text 
        End Select 
         
        sSubj = sSubj & " " & sService & " Service Down." 
        grdStatus.Col = grdStatus.Col - 1 
        Notify 
    End Select 
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    sckMonitor.Close 
  Next 
  grdStatus.Enabled = True 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub cmdExit_Click() 
  If sckMonitor.State <> 0 Then 
    sckMonitor.Close 
    End 
  Else 
    'do nothing 
  End If 
   
  If sckNotify.State <> 0 Then 
    sckNotify.Close 
  Else 
    'do nothing 
  End If 
   
  Unload frmOptions 
  Unload Me 
End Sub 
 
'On Unload, make sure winsock connections are closed 
Private Sub Form_Unload(Cancel As Integer) 
  If sckMonitor.State <> 0 Then 
    sckMonitor.Close 
    End 
  Else 
    'do nothing 
  End If 
   
  If sckNotify.State <> 0 Then 
    sckNotify.Close 
  Else 
    'do nothing 
  End If 
End Sub 
 
'On Terminate, make sure winsock connections are closed 
Private Sub Form_Terminate() 
  If sckMonitor.State <> 0 Then 
    sckMonitor.Close 
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    End 
  Else 
    'do nothing 
  End If 
   
  If sckNotify.State <> 0 Then 
    sckNotify.Close 
  Else 
    'do nothing 
  End If 
End Sub 
 
'Timer event spawn of monitoring 
Private Sub Timer1_Timer() 
  iTimerIterator = iTimerIterator + 1 
   
  If iTimerIterator Mod frmOptions.txtServiceCheckInterval.Text = 0 Then 
    Monitor 
    iTimerIterator = 0 
  Else 
    'do nothing 
  End If 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub LoadConfig() 
  Dim IpAddress As String 
  Dim PortNum As String 
  Dim RowAdded As Integer 
 
  On Error GoTo ErrorH 
  Open "ServiceMonEntries.ini" For Input As #1 
  While Not EOF(1) 
    Input #1, IpAddress, PortNum 
    grdStatus.Row = 1 
    If grdStatus.Text = "" Then 
      grdStatus.Col = sIPAddress 
      grdStatus.Text = IpAddress 
      grdStatus.Col = 1 
      grdStatus.Text = PortNum 
    Else 
      grdStatus.AddItem IpAddress 
      RowAdded = grdStatus.Rows - 1 
      grdStatus.Row = RowAdded 
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      grdStatus.Col = iPortNumber 
      grdStatus.Text = PortNum 
    End If 
  Wend 
   
  Close #1 
  Exit Sub 
ErrorH: 
  LogEvent "Service Monitor Configuration Load Error" 
End Sub 
 
'Log event to log 
Public Sub LogEvent(sWhatHappened As String) 
  Dim sWhatToPrint As String 
 
  On Error GoTo ErrorH 
  Open "ServiceMonLog.txt" For Append As #500 
  sWhatToPrint = Date & "|" & Time & "|" & sWhatHappened 
  Print #500, sWhatToPrint 
  Close #500 
  Exit Sub 
   
ErrorH: 
  Open "ServiceMonLog.txt" For Input As #500 
  Resume Next 
End Sub 
 
Public Sub Notify() 
  State = Start 
  sckNotify.Protocol = sckTCPProtocol 
  sckNotify.RemoteHost = sHost 
  sckNotify.RemotePort = iPort 
  sckNotify.Connect 
End Sub 
 
Public Sub sckNotify_Connect() 
  State = Connect 
End Sub 
 
Public Sub sckNotify_DataArrival(ByVal bytesTotal As Long) 
  Dim sMessage As String 
  Dim sResponse As String 
  Dim sTo As String 
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  Dim sFrom As String 
   
  sTo = frmOptions.txtEmailTo.Text 
  sFrom = frmOptions.txtEmailFrom.Text 
   
  Select Case State 
    Case Connect 
      sckNotify.GetData sResponse, vbString 
      If IsValid(sResponse, "220") Then 
        State = State + 1 
        sMessage = "HELO <" & sHost & ">" & vbCrLf 
        sckNotify.SendData (sMessage) 
      Else 
        sckNotify.Close 
        State = Start 
        Exit Sub 
      End If 
 
    Case Helo 
      sckNotify.GetData sResponse, vbString 
   
      If IsValid(sResponse, "250") Then 
        State = State + 1 
        sMessage = "MAIL FROM:<" & sFrom & ">" & vbCrLf 
        sckNotify.SendData (sMessage) 
 
      Else 
        sckNotify.Close 
        State = Start 
        Exit Sub 
      End If 
 
    Case MailFrom 
      sckNotify.GetData sResponse, vbString 
      If IsValid(sResponse, "250") Or IsValid(sResponse, "251") Then 
        State = State + 1 
        sMessage = "RCPT TO:<" & sTo & ">" & vbCrLf 
        sckNotify.SendData (sMessage) 
      Else 
        sckNotify.Close 
        State = Start 
        Exit Sub 
      End If 
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    Case SendTo 
      sckNotify.GetData sResponse, vbString 
      ' 
      '  
        If IsValid(sResponse, "250") Then 
        State = State + 1 
        sMessage = "DATA" & vbCrLf 
        sckNotify.SendData (sMessage) 
      Else 
        sckNotify.Close 
        State = Start 
        Exit Sub 
      End If 
     
    Case Data 
      sckNotify.GetData sResponse, vbString 
      If IsValid(sResponse, "250") Or IsValid(sResponse, "354") Then 
        State = State + 1 
        sMessage = _ 
        "To: " & sTo & vbNewLine & _ 
        "From: " & sFrom & vbNewLine & _ 
        "Subject: " & sSubj & vbNewLine & _ 
        vbNewLine & _ 
        sBody & vbCrLf & "." & vbCrLf 
        sckNotify.SendData (sMessage) 
      Else 
        sckNotify.Close 
        State = Start 
        Exit Sub 
      End If 
 
    Case MessageData 
      sckNotify.GetData sResponse, vbString 
      State = State + 1 
      sMessage = "QUIT" & vbCrLf 
      sckNotify.SendData (sMessage) 
   
    Case EndMessage 
      sckNotify.GetData sResponse, vbString 
      sckNotify.Close 
      State = Start 
      Exit Sub 
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    Case Else 
      sckNotify.Close 
      Exit Sub 
       
  End Select 
End Sub 
 
Public Function IsValid(sMsg As String, sExpected As String) As Boolean 
  Dim sKey As String 
   
  If Left(sMsg, 3) = sExpected Then 
      IsValid = True 
  Else 
      IsValid = False 
  End If 
End Function 
 
Public Sub sckNotify_Error(ByVal Number As Integer, Description As String, ByVal 
Scode As Long, ByVal Source As String, ByVal HelpFile As String, ByVal 
HelpContext As Long, CancelDisplay As Boolean) 
  sckNotify.Close 
End Sub 
 
'frmOptions 
Private Sub chkAudible_Click() 
  If chkAudible.Value = True Then 
    txtAudibleLocation.Enabled = True 
  Else 
    txtAudibleLocation.Enabled = False 
  End If 
   
  If chkAudible.Value = False Then 
    txtAudibleLocation.Enabled = False 
  Else 
    txtAudibleLocation.Enabled = True 
  End If 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub chkSQL_Click() 
  If chkSQL.Value = True Then 
    Me.txtSQLDt.Enabled = True 
    Me.txtSQLHost.Enabled = True 
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    Me.txtSQLIssue.Enabled = True 
    Me.txtSQLDB.Enabled = True 
    Me.txtSQLPass.Enabled = True 
    Me.txtSQLServer.Enabled = True 
    Me.txtSQLUser.Enabled = True 
  Else 
    Me.txtSQLDt.Enabled = False 
    Me.txtSQLHost.Enabled = False 
    Me.txtSQLIssue.Enabled = False 
    Me.txtSQLDB.Enabled = False 
    Me.txtSQLPass.Enabled = False 
    Me.txtSQLServer.Enabled = False 
    Me.txtSQLUser.Enabled = False 
  End If 
   
  If chkSQL.Value = False Then 
    Me.txtSQLDt.Enabled = False 
    Me.txtSQLHost.Enabled = False 
    Me.txtSQLIssue.Enabled = False 
    Me.txtSQLDB.Enabled = False 
    Me.txtSQLPass.Enabled = False 
    Me.txtSQLServer.Enabled = False 
    Me.txtSQLUser.Enabled = False 
  Else 
    Me.txtSQLDt.Enabled = True 
    Me.txtSQLHost.Enabled = True 
    Me.txtSQLIssue.Enabled = True 
    Me.txtSQLDB.Enabled = True 
    Me.txtSQLPass.Enabled = True 
    Me.txtSQLServer.Enabled = True 
    Me.txtSQLUser.Enabled = True 
  End If 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub cmdExit_Click() 
  Unload Me 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub cmdSave_Click() 
  validateOptions 
  frmOptions.Hide 
End Sub 
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Private Sub Form_Load() 
  txtAudibleLocation.Enabled = False 
  txtTxtLocation.Enabled = False 
  txtSQLDt.Enabled = False 
  txtSQLHost.Enabled = False 
  txtSQLIssue.Enabled = False 
  txtSQLDB.Enabled = False 
  txtSQLPass.Enabled = False 
  txtSQLServer.Enabled = False 
  txtSQLUser.Enabled = False 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub validateOptions() 
  If IsNumeric(txtServiceCheckInterval.Text) Then 
    'ok, continue 
  Else 
    MsgBox ("Service Check Interval Must be Numeric, You Fool of a Took!") 
    'todo: throw exception 
  End If 
End Sub 
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 File Modification Watcher (VB.NET) 
 
This application monitors the localhost file system for file modification.  It was 
used in tracking down embedded services unrecognized by Nessus and Nmap. 
 
Imports System.IO 
Imports System.Diagnostics 
 
Public Class Form1 
    Inherits System.Windows.Forms.Form 
    Public watchfolder As FileSystemWatcher 
 
#Region " Windows Form Designer generated code " 
 
    Public Sub New() 
        MyBase.New() 
 
        'This call is required by the Windows Form Designer. 
        InitializeComponent() 
 
        'Add any initialization after the InitializeComponent() call 
    End Sub 
 
    'Form overrides dispose to clean up the component list. 
    Protected Overloads Overrides Sub Dispose(ByVal disposing As Boolean) 
        If disposing Then 
            If Not (components Is Nothing) Then 
                components.Dispose() 
            End If 
        End If 
        MyBase.Dispose(disposing) 
    End Sub 
 
    'Required by the Windows Form Designer 
    Private components As System.ComponentModel.IContainer 
 
    'NOTE: The following procedure is required by the Windows Form Designer 
    'It can be modified using the Windows Form Designer.   
    'Do not modify it using the code editor. 
    Friend WithEvents txtPath As System.Windows.Forms.TextBox 
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    Friend WithEvents btnStart As System.Windows.Forms.Button 
    Friend WithEvents btnStop As System.Windows.Forms.Button 
    Friend WithEvents txtStatus As System.Windows.Forms.TextBox 
    Friend WithEvents btnClear As System.Windows.Forms.Button 
    <System.Diagnostics.DebuggerStepThrough()> Private Sub 
InitializeComponent() 
        Me.txtPath = New System.Windows.Forms.TextBox 
        Me.btnStart = New System.Windows.Forms.Button 
        Me.btnStop = New System.Windows.Forms.Button 
        Me.txtStatus = New System.Windows.Forms.TextBox 
        Me.btnClear = New System.Windows.Forms.Button 
        Me.SuspendLayout() 
        ' 
        'txtPath 
        ' 
        Me.txtPath.Location = New System.Drawing.Point(8, 16) 
        Me.txtPath.Name = "txtPath" 
        Me.txtPath.Size = New System.Drawing.Size(200, 20) 
        Me.txtPath.TabIndex = 0 
        Me.txtPath.Text = "C:\" 
        ' 
        'btnStart 
        ' 
        Me.btnStart.Location = New System.Drawing.Point(344, 16) 
        Me.btnStart.Name = "btnStart" 
        Me.btnStart.TabIndex = 1 
        Me.btnStart.Text = "Start" 
        ' 
        'btnStop 
        ' 
        Me.btnStop.Location = New System.Drawing.Point(448, 16) 
        Me.btnStop.Name = "btnStop" 
        Me.btnStop.TabIndex = 2 
        Me.btnStop.Text = "Stop" 
        ' 
        'txtStatus 
        ' 
        Me.txtStatus.Location = New System.Drawing.Point(8, 56) 
        Me.txtStatus.Multiline = True 
        Me.txtStatus.Name = "txtStatus" 
        Me.txtStatus.ReadOnly = True 
        Me.txtStatus.ScrollBars = System.Windows.Forms.ScrollBars.Both 
        Me.txtStatus.Size = New System.Drawing.Size(768, 368) 
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        Me.txtStatus.TabIndex = 3 
        Me.txtStatus.Text = "" 
        ' 
        'btnClear 
        ' 
        Me.btnClear.Location = New System.Drawing.Point(552, 16) 
        Me.btnClear.Name = "btnClear" 
        Me.btnClear.TabIndex = 4 
        Me.btnClear.Text = "Clear" 
        ' 
        'Form1 
        ' 
        Me.AutoScaleBaseSize = New System.Drawing.Size(5, 13) 
        Me.ClientSize = New System.Drawing.Size(792, 438) 
        Me.Controls.Add(Me.btnClear) 
        Me.Controls.Add(Me.txtStatus) 
        Me.Controls.Add(Me.btnStop) 
        Me.Controls.Add(Me.btnStart) 
        Me.Controls.Add(Me.txtPath) 
        Me.Name = "Form1" 
        Me.Text = "Drive Watcher" 
        Me.ResumeLayout(False) 
    End Sub 
#End Region 
 
    'List of Notify Filters 
    'Attributes    (The attributes of the file or folder) 
    'CreationTime   (The time the file or folder was created) 
    'DirectoryName  (The name of the directory) 
    'FileName  (The name of the file) 
    'LastAccess  (The date the file or folder was last opened) 
    'LastWrite  (The date the file or folder last had anything written to it) 
    'Security  (The security settings of the file or folder) 
    'Size   (The size of the file or folder) 
 
    Private Sub btnStart_Click(ByVal sender As System.Object, ByVal e As 
System.EventArgs) Handles btnStart.Click 
        watchfolder = New System.IO.FileSystemWatcher() 
        watchfolder.IncludeSubdirectories = True 
 
 
        'this is the path we want to monitor 
        watchfolder.Path = txtPath.Text 
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        'Add a list of Filter we want to specify 
        'make sure you use OR for each Filter as we need to 
        'all of those  
 
        watchfolder.NotifyFilter = IO.NotifyFilters.DirectoryName 
        watchfolder.NotifyFilter = watchfolder.NotifyFilter Or _ 
                                   IO.NotifyFilters.FileName 
        watchfolder.NotifyFilter = watchfolder.NotifyFilter Or _ 
                                   IO.NotifyFilters.Attributes 
 
        ' add the handler to each event 
        AddHandler watchfolder.Changed, AddressOf logchange 
        AddHandler watchfolder.Created, AddressOf logchange 
        AddHandler watchfolder.Deleted, AddressOf logchange 
 
        ' add the rename handler as the signature is different 
        AddHandler watchfolder.Renamed, AddressOf logrename 
 
        'Set this property to true to start watching 
        watchfolder.EnableRaisingEvents = True 
 
        btnStart.Enabled = False 
        btnStop.Enabled = True 
 
        'End of code for btn_start_click 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub logchange(ByVal source As Object, ByVal e As _ 
                        System.IO.FileSystemEventArgs) 
 
 'filter some stupid ones here 
 'ToDo:  Do this the right way. 
        Dim strDontDisplay As String 
        'lstDontDisplay.Text = "C:\documents and settings\rick\ntuser.dat.log" 
        'lstDontDisplay.Text = "C:\windows\system32\config\software.log" 
        'lstDontDisplay.Text = "C:\documents and settings\rick\ntuser.dat" 
 
        strDontDisplay = "C:\documents and settings\rick\ntuser.dat.log" 
        strDontDisplay = "C:\windows\system32\config\software.log" 
        strDontDisplay = "C:\documents and settings\rick\ntuser.dat" 
 
        If e.ChangeType = IO.WatcherChangeTypes.Changed Then 
 90 
 
            If e.FullPath <> strDontDisplay Then 
                txtStatus.Text &= e.FullPath & _ 
                                                     " modified" & vbCrLf 
            End If 
 
        End If 
 
        If e.ChangeType = IO.WatcherChangeTypes.Created Then 
            txtStatus.Text &= e.FullPath & _ 
                                     " created" & vbCrLf 
        End If 
 
        If e.ChangeType = IO.WatcherChangeTypes.Deleted Then 
            txtStatus.Text &= e.FullPath & _ 
                                    " deleted" & vbCrLf 
        End If 
 
    End Sub 
 
    Public Sub logrename(ByVal source As Object, ByVal e As _ 
                                System.IO.RenamedEventArgs) 
        txtStatus.Text &= e.OldName & _ 
                      " renamed to " & e.Name & vbCrLf 
    End Sub 
 
 
    Private Sub btnStop_Click(ByVal sender As System.Object, ByVal e As 
System.EventArgs) Handles btnStop.Click 
        ' Stop watching the folder 
        watchfolder.EnableRaisingEvents = False 
        btnStart.Enabled = True 
        btnStop.Enabled = False 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub btnClear_Click(ByVal sender As System.Object, ByVal e As 
System.EventArgs) Handles btnClear.Click 
        txtStatus.Clear() 
    End Sub 
End Class 
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 Script Based Vulnerability Scanners 
 
During the first few months of this thesis project, when Nessus appeared as 
though it might not complete the scans in time (scans were taking over a month 
to complete), I started working on developing my own subset of vulnerability 
scanners.  These were not needed in the long run, but I include them here as 
they are still a very simple and fast way to scan a network for specific IIS, Nimda, 
anonymous FTP and open port vulnerabilities. 
 
IIS /admin Available 
 
#!/bin/bsh 
#script to automate sweeps for http://address/$vulnString 
 
#variable declarations 
chrDot='.' 
intTarget1Octet='151' 
intTarget2Octet='141' 
intTarget3Octet='8' 
intTarget4Octet='1' 
strTarget='nothing' 
vulnString='/admin' 
strOutputFile='admin' 
 
echo 'STARTING' $vulnString ' SWEEP' > $strOutputFile 
#recursion intTarget1Octet.intTarget2Octet.1-149.1-254 
until test $intTarget3Octet -ge 150; do 
 
  #recursion intTarget1Octet.intTarget2Octet.$intTarget3Octet.1-254 
  until test $intTarget4Octet -ge 255; do 
 
    ping -q -c 1 -s 1 -w 5 
$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3Octet$chrDot$intTa
rget4Octet 
    if test $? -eq 0; then 
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      echo 'Getting 
http://'$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3Octet$chrD
ot$intTarget4Octet$vulnString 
      wget -t 1 -T 1 -S --spider --force-html -a $strOutputFile 
http://$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3Octet$chrDo
t$intTarget4Octet$vulnString 
    else 
      echo $intTarget3Octet$chrDot$intTarget4Octet 'is not up.' 
    fi 
 
      let intTarget4Octet=intTarget4Octet+1   
  done 
  let intTarget4Octet=1 
  let intTarget3Octet=intTarget3Octet+1 
done 
 
echo $vulnString 'sweep is complete!' >> $strOutputFile 
#gzip --best results 
#$SUDO service sendmail start 
#mail -s "WebScan Complete!"  zwrs2@imail.etsu.edu 
#$SUDO service sendmail stop 
 
Default Port Anonymous Enabled FTP 
 
#!/bin/bsh 
#script to automate sweeps for ftp://$strUser@address 
 
#variable declarations 
chrDot='.' 
chrAt='@' 
strUser='Anonymous' 
strPasswd='rick@inter.net' 
intTarget1Octet='151' 
intTarget2Octet='141' 
intTarget3Octet='8' 
intTarget4Octet='1' 
strTarget='nothing' 
#vulnString='/admin' 
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strOutputFile='AnonymousFTP' 
 
echo 'STARTING' $strUser' FTP SWEEP' > $strOutputFile 
#recursion intTarget1Octet.intTarget2Octet.1-149.1-254 
until test $intTarget3Octet -ge 150; do 
 
  #recursion intTarget1Octet.intTarget2Octet.$intTarget3Octet.1-254 
  until test $intTarget4Octet -ge 255; do 
 
    ping -q -c 1 -s 1 -w 5 
$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3Octet$chrDot$intTa
rget4Octet 
    if test $? -eq 0; then 
      echo 'Getting 
ftp://'$strUser$chrAt$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3
Octet$chrDot$intTarget4Octet 
      wget -t 1 -T 1 -S -a $strOutputFile 
ftp://$strUser$chrAt$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3
Octet$chrDot$intTarget4Octet 
    else 
      echo $intTarget3Octet$chrDot$intTarget4Octet 'is not available.' 
    fi 
 
      let intTarget4Octet=intTarget4Octet+1   
  done 
  let intTarget4Octet=1 
  let intTarget3Octet=intTarget3Octet+1 
done 
 
echo $strUser 'FTP sweep is complete!' >> $strOutputFile 
#gzip --best results 
#$SUDO service sendmail start 
#mail -s "WebScan Complete!"  zwrs2@imail.etsu.edu 
#$SUDO service sendmail stop 
 
Full Port Sweep Anonymous Enabled 
 
#!/bin/bsh 
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#script to automate sweeps for ftp://$strUser@address 
 
#variable declarations 
chrDot='.' 
chrAt='@' 
strUser='Anonymous' 
strPasswd='rick@inter.net' 
intPort='1' 
intTarget1Octet='151' 
intTarget2Octet='141' 
intTarget3Octet='8' 
intTarget4Octet='1' 
strTarget='nothing' 
#vulnString='/admin' 
strOutputFile='AnonymousFTP_fullPortSweep' 
 
echo 'STARTING' $strUser' FTP SWEEP' > $strOutputFile 
#recursion intTarget1Octet.intTarget2Octet.1-149.1-254 
until test $intTarget3Octet -ge 150; do 
 
  #recursion intTarget1Octet.intTarget2Octet.$intTarget3Octet.1-254 
  until test $intTarget4Octet -ge 255; do 
 
    ping -q -c 1 -s 1 -w 2 
$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3Octet$chrDot$intTa
rget4Octet > /dev/null 
    if test $? -eq 0; then 
      while [ $intPort -le 65535  ] 
        do 
   echo 'Getting 
ftp://'$strUser$chrAt$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3
Octet$chrDot$intTarget4Octet $intPort 
          #wget -t 1 -T 1 -S -a $strOutputFile 
ftp://$strUser$chrAt$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3
Octet$chrDot$intTarget4Octet $intPort 
          let intPort=intPort+1 
        done 
    else 
      echo $intTarget3Octet$chrDot$intTarget4Octet ' and all ports are not 
available.' 
    fi 
      let intTarget4Octet=intTarget4Octet+1   
  done 
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  let intTarget4Octet=1 
  let intTarget3Octet=intTarget3Octet+1 
done 
 
echo $strUser 'Full FTP sweep is complete!' >> $strOutputFile 
#gzip --best results 
#$SUDO service sendmail start 
#mail -s "WebScan Complete!"  zwrs2@imail.etsu.edu 
#$SUDO service sendmail stop 
 
Nimda Vulnerability 
 
With this sweep, the result file shows HTTP replies to the cmd.exe request, and 
any infected host creates an index.html file displaying the contents of the 
remote host C hard drive which allows the administrator performing the scan to 
locate and patch said machine. 
 
#!/bin/bsh 
#script to automate sweeps for http://address/$vulnString 
 
#variable declarations 
chrDot='.' 
intTarget1Octet='151' 
intTarget2Octet='141' 
intTarget3Octet='8' 
intTarget4Octet='1' 
strTarget='nothing' 
vulnString='/scripts/..%252f../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir' 
strOutputFile='nimda' 
 
echo 'STARTING' $vulnString ' SWEEP' > $strOutputFile 
#recursion intTarget1Octet.intTarget2Octet.1-149.1-254 
until test $intTarget3Octet -ge 150; do 
 
  #recursion intTarget1Octet.intTarget2Octet.$intTarget3Octet.1-254 
  until test $intTarget4Octet -ge 255; do 
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    ping -q -c 1 -s 1 -w 5 
$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3Octet$chrDot$intTa
rget4Octet 
    if test $? -eq 0; then 
      echo 'Getting 
https://'$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3Octet$chrD
ot$intTarget4Octet$vulnString 
      wget -t 1 -T 1 -S --spider --force-html -a $strOutputFile 
http://$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3Octet$chrDo
t$intTarget4Octet$vulnString 
    else 
      echo $intTarget3Octet$chrDot$intTarget4Octet 'is not up.' 
    fi 
 
      let intTarget4Octet=intTarget4Octet+1   
  done 
  let intTarget4Octet=1 
  let intTarget3Octet=intTarget3Octet+1 
done 
 
echo $vulnString 'sweep is complete!' >> $strOutputFile 
#gzip --best results 
#$SUDO service sendmail start 
#mail -s "WebScan Complete!"  zwrs2@imail.etsu.edu 
#$SUDO service sendmail stop 
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 Script Based Assistance Applications 
 
Compression and Archival Script 
 
This script was written to facilitate a quick backup and archival of all research 
related materials.  It also allowed work to be shared between my ETSU office 
computer, and my home computer in a fairly easy and straight forward way. 
 
#!/bin/bsh 
thesisFilename=$(date -I)_bup.tar 
 
echo 'Backing up nessus logs ...' 
cp /usr/local/var/nessus/logs/* /root/thesis/logs/ 
 
echo 'Zipping nessus logs ...' 
gzip --best /root/thesis/logs/* 
 
echo 'Archiving root/thesis/* ...' 
tar -cvf $thesisFilename /root/thesis/* 
 
echo '' 
echo 'Compressing archive ...' 
gzip --best /root/scripts/$thesisFilename 
 
echo 'Moving compressed archive to backup folder ...' 
cp /root/scripts/$thesisFilename.gz /root/backups/ 
 
echo 'Removing temp files ...' 
rm -f /root/scripts/$thesisFilename.gz 
 
echo 'Backup script complete.' 
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Localhost System Log Parser 
 
#!bin/bash 
 
sendTo='/root/info/logParsed' 
mailTo='zwrs2@imail.etsu.edu' 
 
date > $sendTo 
date > /root/info/suDoers 
date > /root/info/promisc 
 
echo '**Promisc. Mode**' >> /root/info/promisc 
cat /var/log/messages | grep promiscuous >> /root/info/promisc 
 
echo '**SU Attempts**' >> /root/info/suDoers 
cat /var/log/messages | grep ' su(pam' >> /root/info/suDoers 
 
echo '**ACCEPTED LOGINS:**' >> /root/info/logParsed 
cat /var/log/secure | grep 'Accepted password' >> /root/info/logParsed 
 
echo '**FAILED LOGINS:**' >> /root/info/logParsed 
cat /var/log/secure | grep 'Failed password for' >> /root/info/logParsed 
 
cat /root/info/suDoers | mail $mailTo 
cat $sendTo | mail -s 'Aeris Log Parser' $mailTo -c root 
 
Root Crontab Cronjobs 
 
######################################################
# 
##                  ## 
## Cronjobs for system maintenance and common tasks. ## 
## Run in root crontab.         Cronjobs file   v.02 ## 
##            Last Updated 10.1.02 ## 
######################################################
# 
 
 # ***  HOURLY  *** 
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 #once an hour check and spawn nessusd if it isn't already 
45 * * * * /usr/local/sbin/nessusd -D 
 
 #every thirty minutes check for new userIDs 
4,34 * * * * sh /root/scripts/newLogins.sh 
 
 # ***  DAILY   *** 
 #every morning at 3:35 up2date & 4:55 up2date packages 
35 3 * * * up2date --force --update --install 
 
55 4 * * * up2date --packages 
 
 #every morning update nessus plugins at 6:50 
50 6 * * * /usr/local/sbin/nessus-update-plugins 
 
 #use rdate to timesync with online timeserver 
10 7 * * * rdate -s time.uconn.edu > /dev/null 
 
 # ***  WEEKLY  *** 
 #record memory info on M @ 330a 
30 3 * * mon cat /proc/meminfo >> /root/info/mem 
 
30 3 * * mon df -k >> /root/info/hdd 
 
 #update nessus on sunday morning 
0 6 * * 0 sh ~/nessusCVS.sh 
 
 #backup /root/thesis info on monday morning 
0 6 * * 1 sh /root/scripts/backup.sh 
 
 # ***  MONTHLY *** 
 #rebuild rpmdb first day of the month at 4 
0 4 1 * * rpmdb –rebuilddb 
 
 #check for new rfcs the second of the month at 3 
0 3 1 * * sh /root/RFCs/getRFCS 
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Nessus Plugin Information Retriever 
 
This script recursively checks the nessus.org web site for plugin background 
information.  It was useful for creating a master list of vulnerability number to 
description matrix displayed in the VBA vulnerability matrix application. 
 
#!/usr/freeware/bin/bash 
#get all nessus plugin info pages 
# v.002 
let pluginNUM=10000 
let maxPLUGIN=10999 
let nine=10009 
let ninetynine=10099 
let nineninenine=10999 
 
while [ $pluginNUM -le $maxPLUGIN ] 
do 
 while [ $pluginNUM -le $nine ] 
  do 
   wget -c -t 0 
http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?id=$pluginNum 
   let pluginNUM=pluginNUM+1 
  done 
 while [ $pluginNUM -le $ninetynine ] 
  do 
   wget -c -t 0 
http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?id=$pluginNum 
   let pluginNUM=pluginNUM+1 
  done 
 while [ $pluginNUM -le $nineninenine ] 
  do 
   wget -c -t 0 
http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?id=$pluginNum 
   let pluginNUM=pluginNUM+1 
  done 
 while [ $pluginNUM -le $maxPLUGIN ] 
  do 
   wget -c -t 0 
http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?id=$pluginNum 
   let pluginNUM=pluginNUM+1 
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  done 
 let pluginNUM=pluginNUM+1 
done 
 
Red Hat New Login(s) Detector 
 
This script was created to use the lastlog binary and monitor new users added to 
the Red Hat system.  It is a very low level security monitor, primarily created to 
afford me an opportunity to learn more about shell scripting. 
 
#!bin/bash 
 
numNormal=1  #+ 1(root) for equal to 
numLogins=$(lastlog | grep -v Never | grep -v Latest | grep -v root | wc -l) 
 
sendTo='/root/info/lastlog' 
mailTo='zwrs2@imail.etsu.edu' 
 
if [ $numLogins -ge $numNormal ] 
then 
 date > $sendTo 
 echo 'New Logins on Nessus2:' >> $sendTo 
 lastlog | grep -v Never | grep -v Latest >> $sendTo 
 cat $sendTo | mail -s 'Nessus2 New Login' $mailTo 
fi 
 
Red Hat ISO Downloader 
 
During this research, I used this script to download new versions of Red Hat Linux 
when they became available (7.2, 7.3, 8.0). 
 
#!/usr/freeware/bin/bash 
#get red hat 8.0 
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#try from a gov mirror 
wget -c -w 30 ftp://mirror.phy.bnl.gov/pub/redhat-
pub/redhat/linux/8.0/en/os/i386/md5sum 
wget -c -w 30 --dot-style=mega ftp://mirror.phy.bnl.gov/pub/redhat-
pub/redhat/linux/8.0/en/os/i386/psyche-i386-disc1.iso 
wget -c -w 30 --dot-style=mega ftp://mirror.phy.bnl.gov/pub/redhat-
pub/redhat/linux/8.0/en/os/i386/psyche-i386-disc2.iso 
wget -c -w 30 --dot-style=mega ftp://mirror.phy.bnl.gov/pub/redhat-
pub/redhat/linux/8.0/en/os/i386/psyche-i386-disc3.iso 
 
#try from edu mirror 
wget -c -w 30 --dot-style=mega ftp://ftp.ece.cornell.edu/pub/linux/redhat/8.0-
en-iso/i386/md5sum 
wget -c -w 30 --dot-style=mega ftp://ftp.ece.cornell.edu/pub/linux/redhat/8.0-
en-iso/i386/psyche-i386-disc1.iso 
wget -c -w 30 --dot-style=mega ftp://ftp.ece.cornell.edu/pub/linux/redhat/8.0-
en-iso/i386/psyche-i386-disc2.iso 
wget -c -w 30  --dot-style=mega ftp://ftp.ece.cornell.edu/pub/linux/redhat/8.0-
en-iso/i386/psyche-i386-disc3.iso 
 
#try from red hat official 
wget -c -w 45 --dot-style=mega 
ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat/linux/8.0/en/iso/i386/md5sum 
wget -c -w 45 --dot-style=mega 
ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat/linux/8.0/en/iso/i386/psyche-i386-disc1.iso 
wget -c -w 45 --dot-style=mega 
ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat/linux/8.0/en/iso/i386/psyche-i386-disc2.iso 
wget -c -w 45 --dot-style=mega 
ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat/linux/8.0/en/iso/i386/psyche-i386-disc3.iso 
 
md5sum * > rh80done 
ls -l >> rh80done 
echo 'RH80 Script Finished' >> rh80done 
cat rh80done | mail zwrs2@imail.etsu.edu 
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APPENDIX C:  PUBLIC SOURCE CODES 
 
Automatically Updating Nessus Plugins 
 
This script was created by the Nessus community and automatically updates the 
Nessus vulnerability plugins. 
 
#!/bin/sh 
# nessus-update-plugins 
# This script will retrieve all the newest plugins from  
# www.nessus.org. 
# 
# NOTE: the use of this script is dangerous as the authenticity of  
#       the scripts is not checked for. USE THIS SCRIPT WITH CAUTION 
#  
# Author  : Renaud Deraison <deraison@cvs.nessus.org> 
# License : GPL (but for two lines of script, does it matter ?) #  
# 
# usage : nessus-update-plugins [-v] 
#  
# -r <name> : read a plugin name 
# -v        : be verbose 
# -vv       : be more verbose (debug) 
 
# Proxy users 
# If you are behind a proxy, you can set this options here 
# or in ~/.nessus-update-pluginsrc 
# 
# If you edit THIS file, then the proxy (and proxy username/password) 
# will be system-wide.  
 
proxy_user= 
proxy_passwd= 
proxy= 
 
# Examples : 
# proxy_user="renaud" 
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# proxy_passwd="topsecr3t" 
# proxy="proxy.fr.nessus.org:8080" 
 
# You can copy the lines above and put them 
# in your ~/.nessus-update-pluginsrc 
 
#-------------- DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE BEYOND THAT POINT ---------------------# 
 
fetch_cmd="/usr/bin/wget -q -O -" 
gzip=/bin/gzip 
prefix=/usr/local 
exec_prefix=${prefix} 
bindir=${exec_prefix}/bin 
sbindir=${exec_prefix}/sbin 
libexecdir=${exec_prefix}/libexec 
datadir=${prefix}/share 
sysconfdir=${prefix}/etc 
sharedstatedir=${prefix}/com 
localstatedir=${prefix}/var 
libdir=${exec_prefix}/lib 
includedir=${prefix}/include 
oldincludedir=/usr/include 
infodir=${prefix}/info 
mandir=${prefix}/man 
 
pluginsdir="$libdir/nessus/plugins" 
 
newdir=`cat $sysconfdir/nessus/nessusd.conf | grep plugins_folder | awk '{print 
$3}'` test -n "$newdir" && pluginsdir="$newdir" 
 
test -z "$fetch_cmd" && { 
 echo "\$fetch_cmd not set in $0 - aborting" 
 exit 1 
 } 
 
fetchprogram=`echo $fetch_cmd | cut -d " " -f 1` 
if [ -n "$fetchprogram" -a ! -x "$fetchprogram" ] 
then 
  echo "The program '$fetchprogram' can not be found or executed" 
  echo "Please configure this script by changing the option" 
  echo "\$fetch_cmd or by installing $fetchprogram" 
  exit 1 
fi 
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# Read the configuration file, if any 
# 
test -f ~/.nessus-update-pluginsrc && . ~/.nessus-update-pluginsrc 
 
help_screen() 
{ 
 echo "nessus-update-plugins 1.0.4, by Renaud Deraison 
<deraison@cvs.nessus.org>"  echo  echo  echo "Usage : nessus-update-plugins [-
v[v]] [-r name] [-h]"  echo 
 echo "-v              : be verbose" 
 echo "-r <pluginname> : view the content of a plugin" 
 echo "-i <pluginname> : only install <pluginname>" 
 echo "-h              : this help screen" 
 echo 
 echo "Default action  : update the nessusd plugins" 
 exit 0 
} 
 
view_plugin() 
{ 
 if [ -n "$fetch_cmd" ]; 
 then 
  $fetch_cmd $proxyopts "http://www.nessus.org/nasl/$1" 
 fi 
 exit 0 
} 
 
install_plugin() 
{ 
if [ -n "$fetch_cmd" ]; 
then 
test -f "$pluginsdir/$1" && mv "$pluginsdir/$1" "$pluginsdir/$1.bak" $fetch_cmd 
$proxyopts "http://www.nessus.org/nasl/$1" > "$libdir/nessus/plugins/$1" grep 
"404 Not Found" "$pluginsdir/plugins/$1" 2>&1 > /dev/null && { 
 echo "Error - file not found" 
 rm -f "$pluginsdir/$1" 
 test -f "$pluginsdir/$1.bak" && mv "$pluginsdir/$1.bak" "$pluginsdir/$1" 
 } 
  
# HUP nessusd 
test -f ${prefix}/var/nessus/nessusd.pid && ( 
    pid=`cat ${prefix}/var/nessus/nessusd.pid` 
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    kill -1 $pid 2>/dev/null 
) 
 exit 0 
 
else 
echo "Error \$fetch_cmd or \$gzip are not set - abort" 
exit 1 
fi 
} 
 
 
proxyopts="" 
 
echo "$fetch_cmd" | grep "lynx" 2>&1 > /dev/null && 
{ 
 test -n "$proxy" && http_proxy="http://$proxy/" 
 test -n "$proxy_user" && proxyopts="-pauth=\"$proxy_user:$proxy_passwd\"" 
}  
 
echo "$fetch_cmd" | grep "wget" 2>&1 > /dev/null && 
{ 
 test -n "$proxy" && http_proxy="http://$proxy/" 
 test -n "$proxy_user" && proxyopts="--proxy=on --proxy-user=$proxy_user --proxy-
passwd=$proxy_passwd" } 
 
export http_proxy 
 
opts=`getopt "vlr:hi:" $*` 
 
for i in $opts 
do 
 case $i in 
 -h ) 
   help_screen 
   ;; 
    
  -v) 
   if [ -z "$verbose" ]; 
    then 
      verbose="y" 
     else 
       set -x 
   fi 
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   ;; 
  
 -r) 
   expect_r="y" 
   ;; 
    
  -i) 
   expect_i="y" 
   ;; 
     
  *) 
   test -n "$expect_r" && 
     { 
      plug_name="$i" 
      unset expect_r 
     } 
      
   test -n "$expect_i" && 
     { 
      install_plug="$i" 
      unset expect_i 
     }   
   ;; 
 esac 
done    
 
test -n "$plug_name" && view_plugin "$plug_name" 
test -n "$install_plug" && install_plugin "$install_plug" 
 
tar="-xf"  
test -z "$verbose" || tar="-xvf" 
 
case `id` in uid=0*) ;; *) 
    echo "only root should use nessus-update-plugins" 
        exit 1 
 esac 
  
if [ -n "$fetch_cmd" -a -n "$gzip" ] ; 
then 
cwd=`pwd` 
tmpdir=$TEMPDIR 
test -z "$tmpdir" && 
{ 
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 tmpdir=$TMPDIR 
 test -z "$tmpdir" && tmpdir=/tmp 
} 
mkdir "$tmpdir/nessus-update-plugins-$$" || { 
 echo "Could not create temporary directory ($tmpdir/nessus-update-
plugins-$$)" 
 exit 1 
} 
cd "$tmpdir/nessus-update-plugins-$$" 
$fetch_cmd $proxyopts http://www.nessus.org/nasl/all-2.0.tar.gz > all-2.0.tar.gz 
test -f all-2.0.tar.gz || { 
 echo "Downloading http://www.nessus.org/nasl/all-2.0.tar.gz failed" 
 cd "$cwd" 
 rm -rf "$tmpdir/nessus-update-plugins-$$" 
 exit 1 
 } 
  
cat all-2.0.tar.gz | $gzip -cd 2>/dev/null > all-2.0.tar 
test $? = 0 || { 
 mv all-2.0.tar.gz all-2.0.tar # Some version of lynx gunzip data on the fly 
} 
cat all-2.0.tar | tar $tar -  
rm all-2.0.tar 
test -f nessus_detect.nasl || { 
 echo "Something went wrong when installing the plugins - uncompressing 
the plugins archive failed" 
 cd "$cwd" 
 rm -rf "$tmpdir/nessus-update-plugins-$$" 
 exit 1 
 } 
  
cp *.nasl "$pluginsdir/" 
cp *.inc "$pluginsdir/" 
cd "$cwd" 
rm -rf "$tmpdir/nessus-update-plugins-$$" 
chown 0 $pluginsdir/*.nasl 
chgrp 0 $pluginsdir/*.inc 
 
# HUP nessusd 
test -f ${prefix}/var/nessus/nessusd.pid && { 
    pid=`cat ${prefix}/var/nessus/nessusd.pid` 
    kill -1 $pid 2>/dev/null 
} 
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 exit 0 
else 
 echo "Error \$fetch_cmd or \$gzip are not set - abort" 
exit 1 
fi 
 
Automatically Updating the Nessus Application 
 
The following script was created by the Nessus community to automatically 
update the application. 
 
  
#!/bin/sh 
#nessusCVS.sh script 
#used to update nessus on localhost 
#minor modifications made by Jim Ashe and Rick Simons to 
# a script posted on the Nessus FAQ. 
 
NESSUSROOT=/usr/local/src 
NESSUSLIBOPS="--disable-cipher" 
NESSUSCOREOPS="--disable-cipher \ 
    --enable-save-kb \ 
    --enable-save-sessions \ 
    --enable-gtk \ 
    --enable-syslog" 
if [ -f /usr/bin/sudo ]; then 
SUDO="/usr/bin/sudo" 
fi 
 
cd $NESSUSROOT 
 
addcvspass() 
{ 
echo ":pserver:anonymous@cvs.nessus.org:/usr/local/cvs Ay=0=" >> 
$HOME/.cvspass } 
 
retrieve_by_cvs() 
{ 
test -f $HOME/.cvspass || addcvspass 
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grep ":pserver:anonymous@cvs.nessus.org:/usr/local/cvs" $HOME/.cvspass 2>&1 
> /dev/null || addcvspass 
CVSROOT=":pserver:anonymous@cvs.nessus.org:/usr/local/cvs" 
export CVSROOT 
 
# ************ 
# ************ 
# ************ 
# ************ 
# change update/checkout depending on if this is first install or not 
cvs -z3 checkout $1 nessus-libraries 
cvs -z3 checkout $1 libnasl 
cvs -z3 checkout $1 nessus-core 
cvs -z3 checkout $1 nessus-plugins 
# change update/checkout depending on if this is first install or not 
# ************ 
# ************ 
# ************ 
# ************ 
} 
 
retrieve_by_cvs 
 
# Kill running versions! 
$SUDO killall nessusd 
$SUDO killall nessus 
 
# CLEANUP old stuff! 
cd $NESSUSROOT/nessus-libraries 
 
# uninstall-nessus begin 
prefix=/usr/local 
exec_prefix=${prefix} 
bindir=${exec_prefix}/bin 
sbindir=${exec_prefix}/sbin 
libexecdir=${exec_prefix}/libexec 
datadir=${prefix}/share 
sysconfdir=${prefix}/etc 
sharedstatedir=${prefix}/com 
localstatedir=${prefix}/var 
libdir=${exec_prefix}/lib 
includedir=${prefix}/include 
oldincludedir=/usr/include 
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infodir=${prefix}/info 
mandir=${prefix}/man 
 
test "$1" = "-q" && quiet=yes 
 
# check whether we have echo -n, depending 
# on the current shell, used 
case `echo -n` in 
\-n)    Xn=   ; Xc='\c' ;; 
*)      Xn=-n ; Xc= 
esac 
 
# make sure that we are root, if there is no id command, 
# you loose, anyway 
case `id 2>/dev/null` in 
uid=0*) 
    ;; 
*) 
    echo "only root should use uninstall-nessus" 
    exit 1 
esac 
 
test -z "$quiet" && 
{ 
echo "--------------------------------------------------------------------------------" 
echo "                          UN-INSTALLATION OF NESSUS" 
echo "--------------------------------------------------------------------------------" 
} 
 
# 
# Step 2 - delete files 
# 
 
set -x 
rm -f  $bindir/nasl 
rm -f  $bindir/nasl-config 
rm -f  $bindir/nessus 
rm -f  $bindir/nessus-config 
rm -f  $bindir/nessus-build 
rm -f  $bindir/nessus-mkrand 
 
rm -f  $sbindir/nessus-adduser 
rm -f  $sbindir/nessus-rmuser 
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rm -f  $sbindir/nessusd 
rm -f  $sbindir/nessus-update-plugins 
rm -f  $sbindir/nessus-mkcert 
 
rm -rf $includedir/nessus 
 
rm -f  $libdir/libhosts_gatherer.* 
rm -f  $libdir/libnasl.* 
rm -f  $libdir/libnessus.* 
rm -f  $libdir/libpcap-nessus.* 
 
rm -rf $libdir/nessus 
rm -f  $mandir/man1/nasl-config.1 
rm -f  $mandir/man1/nasl.1 
rm -f  $mandir/man1/nessus-build.1 
rm -f  $mandir/man1/nessus-config.1 
rm -f  $mandir/man1/nessus.1 
rm -f  $mandir/man1/nessus-mkrand.1 
rm -f  $mandir/man8/nessus-mkcert.8 
 
rm -f  $mandir/man8/nessus-adduser.8 
rm -f  $mandir/man8/nessus-rmuser.8 
rm -f  $mandir/man8/nessus-update-plugins.8 
rm -f  $mandir/man8/nessusd.8 
 
set +x 
 
echo "Finished" 
rm -f $sbindir/uninstall-nessus 
# uninstall-nessus end 
 
make distclean 
cd $NESSUSROOT/libnasl 
make distclean 
cd $NESSUSROOT/nessus-core 
make distclean 
cd $NESSUSROOT/nessus-plugins 
make distclean 
 
# Now it's time to rock and roll. 
cd $NESSUSROOT/nessus-libraries 
./configure $NESSUSLIBOPS 2>&1|tee config.log 
make 2>&1|tee make.log 
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$SUDO make install 2>&1|tee make-install.log 
$SUDO ldconfig 
 
cd $NESSUSROOT/libnasl 
./configure 2>&1|tee config.log 
make 2>&1|tee make.log 
$SUDO make install 2>&1|tee make-install.log 
$SUDO ldconfig 
 
cd $NESSUSROOT/nessus-core 
./configure $NESSUSCOREOPS 2>&1|tee config.log 
make 2>&1|tee make.log 
$SUDO make install 2>&1|tee make-install.log 
 
cd $NESSUSROOT/nessus-plugins 
./configure 2>&1|tee config.log 
make 2>&1|tee make.log 
make install 2>&1|tee make-install.log 
 
#$SUDO nessusd -D 
/usr/local/sbin/nessusd –D 
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APPENDIX D:  CHARTS, TABLES AND DATA SAMPLES 
 
OIT Administration Work Log Sample 
 
Thesis Worklog 
DATE START STOP ACT ACTIVITY DETAILS 
9.10.02 8:00a 1:30p OIT 
Updated & compiled latest version of Nessus security scanner & 
updated plugin information.  Updated OS on Aeris.etsu.edu (22 
packages).  Called Janet & rolled to voice mail, left message.  
Started Scanning .66.* & .67.*.  Updated crontab and copied 
some logger scripts.  Scanned Jim Ashe's machine per his request, 
discussed outcome.  Talked with Steve, OIT wants to move Aeris 
(the nessus server) to the break room to free up the conference 
room.  I advised I could move it whenever he wanted me to, but 
he asked we wait another day or two.  He updated me that a 
windows machine was to be put together (so I can have access 
to REMEDY), once the parts were obtained. 
9.12.02 8:00a 3:00p OIT 
Came in and the scan of Rogers Stout was *STILL* going.  Checked 
out what was going on and I had incorrectly used CIDR notation 
and one of the settings for continuing to pursue dead machines 
(punching thru software firewalls) was set which dramatically 
increased the scan time per IP.  Went to the Culp Center and 
created a new ID, got some red tape and cost data from them as 
the request was for Expiration date XX-XX-XXXX which they would 
not honor.  I requested, after much back and forth and their failed 
attempts to contact OIT management, they put 1.01.03 
tentatively.  Reviewed the security scripts and updated some of 
the mail scripts with some command line options I found in the 
manual page for mail.  Did some research, while the scan was still 
going, on how to disable some services in Win* operating systems. 
Goals for Next Week 
Move Aeris to break room.  (T | R) 
Get a phone for the conference room or move back to break room. (T) 
Analyze the .67 & .68 results. (T) 
Contact the .67 & .68 users & set up time on R to touch machines. (T) 
Talk to Steve to find out the next building to touch. (T) 
Contact Janet and get privacy document. (T) & Start scan of next building (T | R) 
Touch as many machines as I can from .67 & .68 range. (.R) 
Obsticles for Next Week 
If a windows machine cannot be pieced together, find one to use REMEDY on temporarily. 
If a phone cannot be found use the one in the break room temporarily. 
Make sure to keep good notes for every machine touched and every phone call / interaction.  
This will make the writeup easier, but also protect yourself as much as possible. 
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 Vulnerability Assessment Data Samples 
Subnet Computer Vulnerability Output NSR Example 
 
This is sample output from one of the subnet scans.  The entire sweep contains 
approximately 21,000 lines and is over 650 pages.  It is truncated below for 
brevity. 
 
 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|unknown (135/tcp)|10736|INFO|;DCE services running on the 
remote can be enumerated;by connecting on port 135 and doing the 
appropriate;queries.;;An attacker may use this fact to gain more 
knowledge;about the remote host.;;Solution : filter incoming traffic to this 
port.;Risk factor : Low 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10394|REPORT|;. It was possible to log 
into the remote host using a NULL session.;The concept of a NULL session is to 
provide a null username and;a null password, which grants the user the 'guest' 
access;;To prevent null sessions, see MS KB Article Q143474 (NT 4.0) and;Q246261 
(Windows 2000). ;Note that this won't completely disable null sessions, but will 
;prevent them from connecting to IPC$;;. All the smb tests will be done as ''/'' in 
domain  
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10398|INFO|The domain SID can be 
obtained remotely. Its value is :;;PWRK12 : 5-21-2530647383-1337471377-
581806562;;An attacker can use it to obtain the list of the local users of this 
host;Solution : filter the ports 137 to 139 and 445;Risk factor : Low;;CVE : CVE-
2000-1200; 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10859|INFO|The host SID can be 
obtained remotely. Its value is :;;PWRK12 : 5-21-2530647383-1337471377-
581806562;;An attacker can use it to obtain the list of the local users of this 
host;Solution : filter the ports 137 to 139 and 445;Risk factor : Low;;CVE : CVE-
2000-1200; 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10399|INFO|The domain SID could be 
used to enumerate the names of the users;of this domain. ;(we only enumerated 
users name whose ID is between 1000 and 1200;for performance reasons);This 
gives extra knowledge to an attacker, which;is not a good thing : ;- 
Administrator account name : monarch (id 500);- Guest account name : Guest 
(id 501);- ETSUADMIN$ (id 1004);- mike (id 1008);- morgansd (id 1009);- test1 (id 
1013);- test2 (id 1014);- morgans (id 1030);- wissell (id 1036);- whitet (id 1037);- 
dively (id 1038);- brownd (id 1039);- blankenm (id 1043);- bader (id 1047);- 
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chenowet (id 1051);- myersn (id 1053);- greerg (id 1054);- fischman (id 1055);- 
oxendine (id 1056);- moorecf (id 1057);- whiteb (id 1058);- woodsidj (id 1059);- 
cass root (id 1061);- cassarchives (id 1063);- t_rudya (id 1064);- cassencyclo (id 
1065);- casscass (id 1066);- bonnie (id 1068);- pagem (id 1080);- whitson (id 
1081);- olson (id 1083);- waltersg (id 1086);- A (id 1175);- A73ETHEL (id 1176);- 
ABELL (id 1177);- ABROWN (id 1178);- ACUFFR (id 1179);- ADAMSJ (id 1180);- 
ADAMSL (id 1181);- ADAMSM (id 1182);- ADAMSS (id 1183);- ADDINGTO (id 
1184);- ADDISON (id 1185);- ADDISONB (id 1186);- ADKINS (id 1187);- ADKINSR (id 
1188);- AESCHLIM (id 1189);- AGARWAL (id 1190);- AHMADA (id 1191);- AIRHART 
(id 1192);- AKARDL (id 1193);- AKERS (id 1194);- ALBRECHR (id 1195);- ALBRECHT 
(id 1196);- ALDEN (id 1197);- ALEXANDC (id 1198);- ALFORD (id 1199);;Risk factor : 
Medium;Solution : filter incoming connections this port;;CVE : CVE-2000-1200; 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10907|INFO|;The guest user belongs to 
groups other than ;guest users or domain guests.;;As guest should not have any 
privilege, you should;fix this.;;Risk factor : Medium 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10397|INFO|Here is the browse list of 
the remote host : ;;ACCESS - PATHWORKS V6.0C for OpenVMS (Advanced 
Server);ETSU83163 - ;ETSU84975 - ;JONESHOME - Jones Home;PWRK12BDC1 - NT 
4.0 BDC;PWRK12NT - NT 4.0 BDC;PWRKCLU - PATHWORKS V6.0C for OpenVMS 
(Alias);TAFR82915 - ;TAFR82916 - ;TAFR82923 - ;;;This is potentially dangerous as this 
may help the attack;of a potential hacker by giving him extra targets to check 
for;;Solution : filter incoming traffic to this port;Risk factor : Low; 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10898|INFO|The following accounts 
have never changed their password 
:;;monarch;Guest;mike;morgansd;test1;test2;morgans;wissell;whitet;dively;brown
d;blankenm;bader;chenowet;myersn;greerg;fischman;oxendine;moorecf;white
b;woodsidj;t_rudya;bonnie;pagem;whitson;olson;waltersg;A;A73ETHEL;ABELL;ABR
OWN;ACUFFR;ADAMSJ;ADAMSL;ADAMSM;ADAMSS;ADDINGTO;ADDISON;ADDIS
ONB;ADKINS;ADKINSR;AESCHLIM;AGARWAL;AHMADA;AIRHART;AKARDL;AKERS;A
LBRECHR;ALBRECHT;ALDEN;ALEXANDC;ALFORD;;;To minimize the risk of break-in, 
users should;change their password regularly 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10899|INFO|The following accounts 
have never logged in 
:;;Guest;ETSUADMIN$;morgansd;test1;morgans;chenowet;t_rudya;whitson;ADAM
SJ;ADAMSM;ADAMSS;ADDINGTO;ADDISON;ADDISONB;ADKINSR;AESCHLIM;AGAR
WAL;AHMADA;AKARDL;AKERS;ALBRECHR;ALBRECHT;ALDEN;ALFORD;;;Unused 
accounts are very helpful to hacker;Solution : suppress these accounts;Risk 
factor : Medium 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10900|INFO|The following accounts 
have passwords which never expire 
:;;monarch;Guest;mike;test1;test2;brownd;blankenm;chenowet;myersn;greerg;fis
chman;moorecf;woodsidj;t_rudya;olson;A;ACUFFR;;;Password should have a 
limited lifetime;Solution : disable password non-expiry;Risk factor : Medium 
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00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10785|NOTE|The remote native lan 
manager is : NT LAN Manager 4.0;The remote Operating System is : Windows NT 
4.0;The remote SMB Domain Name is : PWRK12; 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10428|NOTE|;;Nessus did not access 
the remote registry completely,;because this needs to be logged in as 
administrator.;;If you want the permissions / values of all the sensitive;registry keys 
to be checked for, we recommend that;you fill the 'SMB Login' options in 
the;'Prefs.' section of the client by the administrator;login name and 
password.;;** Since the password will be sent in clear text, we;suggest you 
change its value for something else;during the test, as anyone will be able to 
eavesdrop;it;;*** If you are working in a highly sensitive;environment where a 
second of insecurity;may be critical to you, then forget this;warning and use 
other tools to check locally;the security of your NT keys.;;Risk factor : None 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10428|NOTE|;;Nessus did not access 
the remote registry completely,;because this needs to be logged in as 
administrator.;;If you want the permissions / values of all the sensitive;registry keys 
to be checked for, we recommend that;you fill the 'SMB Login' options in 
the;'Prefs.' section of the client by the administrator;login name and 
password.;;** Since the password will be sent in clear text, we;suggest you 
change its value for something else;during the test, as anyone will be able to 
eavesdrop;it;;*** If you are working in a highly sensitive;environment where a 
second of insecurity;may be critical to you, then forget this;warning and use 
other tools to check locally;the security of your NT keys.;;Risk factor : None 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10908|NOTE|The following users are in 
the domain administrator group :;. monarch;;You should make sure that only the 
proper users are member of this; group;Risk factor : Low 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10895|NOTE|The following accounts 
were disabled automatically by the system:;;Guest;;;This probably means that 
these accounts were subject to brute force attacks;Risk factor : Low 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10897|NOTE|The following accounts 
are disabled :;;Guest;morgansd;AGARWAL;AKERS;ALDEN;;;To minimize the risk of 
break-in, permanently disabled accounts;should be deleted;Risk factor : Low 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|unknown (1027/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening 
on 151.141.8.183:1027 : ;;     Type: ncacn_ip_tcp;     UUID : 3457780d-3412-cd12-
abef-012345678900; 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|unknown (1027/tcp)| 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|unknown (2701/tcp)| 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|unknown (2702/tcp)| 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|unknown (8084/tcp)| 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|general/tcp|10201|INFO|;The remote host uses non-random 
IP IDs, that is, it is;possible to predict the next value of the ip_id field of;the ip 
packets sent by this host.;;An attacker may use this feature to determine if the 
remote;host sent a packet in reply to another request. This may be;used for 
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portscanning and other things.;;Solution : Contact your vendor for a patch;Risk 
factor : Low 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|general/tcp|10201|INFO|;The remote host uses non-random 
IP IDs, that is, it is;possible to predict the next value of the ip_id field of;the ip 
packets sent by this host.;;An attacker may use this feature to determine if the 
remote;host sent a packet in reply to another request. This may be;used for 
portscanning and other things.;;Solution : Contact your vendor for a patch;Risk 
factor : Low 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|general/tcp|10336|NOTE|Nmap found that this host is 
running Turtle Beach AudioTron Firmware 3.0, Windows NT4 or 95/98/98SE; 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|general/tcp|10337|NOTE|QueSO has found out that the 
remote host OS is ;* WindowsNT, Cisco 11.2(10a), HP/3000 DTC, BayStack 
Switch;;;CVE : CAN-1999-0454; 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ns (137/udp)|10150|INFO|. The following 9 NetBIOS 
names have been gathered :; PWRK12BDC1     ; PWRK12BDC1     ; PWRK12         ; 
PWRK12         ; PWRK12         ; PWRK12         ; PWRK12BDC1     ; PWRK12         ;   
__MSBROWSE__ ;. The remote host has the following MAC address on its adapter 
:;   0x00 0x60 0x08 0x03 0x59 0x3b ;;If you do not want to allow everyone to find 
the NetBios name;of your computer, you should filter incoming traffic to this 
port.;;Risk factor : Medium 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|general/udp|10287|NOTE|For your information, here is the 
traceroute to 151.141.8.183 : ;151.141.8.183; 
00.60.08.03.59.3b|general/udp| 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|unknown (135/tcp)| 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10394|REPORT|;. It was possible to log 
into the remote host using a NULL session.;The concept of a NULL session is to 
provide a null username and;a null password, which grants the user the 'guest' 
access;;To prevent null sessions, see MS KB Article Q143474 (NT 4.0) and;Q246261 
(Windows 2000). ;Note that this won't completely disable null sessions, but will 
;prevent them from connecting to IPC$;;. All the smb tests will be done as ''/'' in 
domain  
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10398|INFO|The domain SID can be 
obtained remotely. Its value is :;;ETSU : 5-21-606747145-1409082233-725345543;;An 
attacker can use it to obtain the list of the local users of this host;Solution : filter 
the ports 137 to 139 and 445;Risk factor : Low;;CVE : CVE-2000-1200; 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10859|INFO|The host SID can be 
obtained remotely. Its value is :;;SOFTSERV : 5-21-1708005366-585710377-
1136263860;;An attacker can use it to obtain the list of the local users of this 
host;Solution : filter the ports 137 to 139 and 445;Risk factor : Low;;CVE : CVE-
2000-1200; 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10399|INFO|The domain SID could be 
used to enumerate the names of the users;of this domain. ;(we only enumerated 
users name whose ID is between 1000 and 1200;for performance reasons);This 
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gives extra knowledge to an attacker, which;is not a good thing : ;- 
Administrator account name : Administrator (id 500);- Guest account name : 
NotGuest (id 501);- TsInternetUser (id 1000);- IUSR_JCDC1 (id 1001);- 
IWAM_JCDC1 (id 1002);- WINS Users (id 1003);- JCDC1$ (id 1004);- DnsAdmins (id 
1105);- DnsUpdateProxy (id 1106);- QIP Users (id 1108);- JCDC2$ (id 1109);- 
ETSUADMIN$ (id 1110);- ServiceAD (id 1111);- IMAIL$ (id 1112);- PWRK12$ (id 
1113);- Exchange Domain Servers (id 1123);- Exchange Enterprise Servers (id 
1124);- antivirus_root (id 1129);- IMailDevelopers (id 1130);- NAI Software Users (id 
1131);- Networking (id 1132);- OIT (id 1133);- User Services (id 1137);- BCOOK (id 
1138);- CAPPSL (id 1139);- COM (id 1146);- Multimedia (id 1147);- Test Group (id 
1148);- 62E54D8C-5B5B-4373-8 (id 1151);- STEVE (id 1164);- ETSU86342$ (id 1166);- 
WEBDEV$ (id 1173);- ETSU86343$ (id 1174);- ETSUFE1$ (id 1175);- B2FD3B0A-3263-
43EF-A (id 1178);- HELPDESK2$ (id 1179);- ARAdmins (id 1181);- ETSUCM$ (id 
1182);- loftusc (id 1184);- faculty root (id 1185);- Faculty web (id 1186);- TracData 
(id 1187);- ABALDWIN (id 1188);- JANET (id 1189);- BachAccessDB (id 1190);- 
Nursing (id 1191);- Registrar (id 1192);- ETSU87863$ (id 1193);- WAGOLD$ (id 
1194);- mike (id 1195);- docwarehouse (id 1198);- BRAGG (id 1199);;Risk factor : 
Medium;Solution : filter incoming connections this port;;CVE : CVE-2000-1200; 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10860|INFO|The host SID could be 
used to enumerate the names of the local users;of this host. ;(we only 
enumerated users name whose ID is between 1000 and 1200;for performance 
reasons);This gives extra knowledge to an attacker, which;is not a good thing : ;- 
Administrator account name : Administrator (id 500);- Guest account name : 
Guest (id 501);- SMSCliSvcAcct& (id 1003);- SMSCliToknAcct& (id 1004);;Risk 
factor : Medium;Solution : filter incoming connections this port;;CVE : CVE-2000-
1200; 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10915|INFO|The following local 
accounts have never logged in :;;Guest;;;Unused accounts are very helpful to 
hacker;Solution : suppress these accounts;Risk factor : Medium 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10916|INFO|The following local 
accounts have passwords which never expire 
:;;Administrator;Guest;SMSCliSvcAcct&;SMSCliToknAcct&;;;Password should have 
a limited lifetime;Solution : disable password non-expiry;Risk factor : Medium 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10900|INFO|The following accounts 
have passwords which never expire :;;Administrator;;;Password should have a 
limited lifetime;Solution : disable password non-expiry;Risk factor : Medium 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10785|NOTE|The remote native lan 
manager is : NT LAN Manager 4.0;The remote Operating System is : Windows NT 
4.0;The remote SMB Domain Name is : ETSU; 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10428|NOTE|;;Nessus did not access 
the remote registry completely,;because this needs to be logged in as 
administrator.;;If you want the permissions / values of all the sensitive;registry keys 
to be checked for, we recommend that;you fill the 'SMB Login' options in 
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the;'Prefs.' section of the client by the administrator;login name and 
password.;;** Since the password will be sent in clear text, we;suggest you 
change its value for something else;during the test, as anyone will be able to 
eavesdrop;it;;*** If you are working in a highly sensitive;environment where a 
second of insecurity;may be critical to you, then forget this;warning and use 
other tools to check locally;the security of your NT keys.;;Risk factor : None 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10428|NOTE|;;Nessus did not access 
the remote registry completely,;because this needs to be logged in as 
administrator.;;If you want the permissions / values of all the sensitive;registry keys 
to be checked for, we recommend that;you fill the 'SMB Login' options in 
the;'Prefs.' section of the client by the administrator;login name and 
password.;;** Since the password will be sent in clear text, we;suggest you 
change its value for something else;during the test, as anyone will be able to 
eavesdrop;it;;*** If you are working in a highly sensitive;environment where a 
second of insecurity;may be critical to you, then forget this;warning and use 
other tools to check locally;the security of your NT keys.;;Risk factor : None 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10913|NOTE|The following local 
accounts are disabled :;;Guest;;;To minimize the risk of break-in, permanently 
disabled accounts;should be deleted;Risk factor : Low 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|unknown (2701/tcp)| 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|unknown (2702/tcp)| 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|unknown (6050/tcp)| 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|unknown (8084/tcp)| 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|unknown (41523/tcp)| 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|general/tcp|10201|INFO|;The remote host uses non-random 
IP IDs, that is, it is;possible to predict the next value of the ip_id field of;the ip 
packets sent by this host.;;An attacker may use this feature to determine if the 
remote;host sent a packet in reply to another request. This may be;used for 
portscanning and other things.;;Solution : Contact your vendor for a patch;Risk 
factor : Low 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|general/tcp|10201|INFO|;The remote host uses non-random 
IP IDs, that is, it is;possible to predict the next value of the ip_id field of;the ip 
packets sent by this host.;;An attacker may use this feature to determine if the 
remote;host sent a packet in reply to another request. This may be;used for 
portscanning and other things.;;Solution : Contact your vendor for a patch;Risk 
factor : Low 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|general/tcp|10336|NOTE|Nmap found that this host is 
running Microsoft NT 4.0 SP5-SP6; 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|general/tcp|10337|NOTE|QueSO has found out that the 
remote host OS is ;* WindowsNT, Cisco 11.2(10a), HP/3000 DTC, BayStack 
Switch;;;CVE : CAN-1999-0454; 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ns (137/udp)|10150|INFO|. The following 6 NetBIOS 
names have been gathered :; SOFTSERV       ; ETSU           ; SOFTSERV       ; 
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SOFTSERV       ; ETSU           ; SOFTSERV       ;. The remote host has the following 
MAC address on its adapter :;   0x00 0x60 0x97 0xac 0x28 0x96 ;;If you do not 
want to allow everyone to find the NetBios name;of your computer, you should 
filter incoming traffic to this port.;;Risk factor : Medium 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|general/udp|10287|NOTE|For your information, here is the 
traceroute to 151.141.8.175 : ;151.141.8.175; 
00.60.97.ac.28.96|general/udp| 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|smtp (25/tcp)|10258|REPORT|;;The remote SMTP server did 
not complain when issued the;command :; MAIL FROM: |testing; ;This probably 
means that it is possible to send mail ;that will be bounced to a program, which 
is ;a serious threat, since this allows anyone to execute ;arbitrary commands on 
this host.;;*** This security hole might be a false positive, since;*** some MTAs will 
not complain to this test, but instead;*** just drop the message silently;   ;Solution 
: upgrade your MTA or change it.;;Risk factor : High;CVE : CVE-1999-0203; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|smtp (25/tcp)|10259|REPORT|;;The remote SMTP server did 
not complain when issued the;command :; MAIL FROM: root@this_host; RCPT TO: 
/tmp/nessus_test; ;This probably means that it is possible to send mail directly;to 
files, which is a serious threat, since this allows;anyone to overwrite any file on 
the remote server.;;*** This security hole might be a false positive, since;*** some 
MTAs will not complain to this test, but instead;*** just drop the message 
silently.;*** Check for the presence of file 'nessus_test' in /tmp !;   ;Solution : 
upgrade your MTA or change it.;;Risk factor : High 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|smtp (25/tcp)|10261|REPORT|;;The remote SMTP server did 
not complain when issued the;command :; MAIL FROM: root@this_host; RCPT TO: 
|testing; ;This probably means that it is possible to send mail directly;to 
programs, which is a serious threat, since this allows;anyone to execute arbitrary 
commands on this host.;;*** This security hole might be a false positive, since;*** 
some MTAs will not complain to this test, but instead;*** just drop the message 
silently.;   ;Solution : upgrade your MTA or change it.;;Risk factor : High;CVE : 
CAN-1999-0163; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|smtp (25/tcp)|10330|NOTE|An SMTP server is running on this 
port;Here is its banner : ;220 jcdc2.etsu.edu Microsoft ESMTP MAIL Service, 
Version: 5.0.2195.5329 ready at  Mon, 16 Sep 2002 17:50:16 -0400  
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|smtp (25/tcp)|10263|NOTE|Remote SMTP server banner 
:;jcdc2.etsu.edu Microsoft ESMTP MAIL Service, Version: 5.0.2195.5329 ready at  
Mon, 16 Sep 2002 17:54:23 -0400 ;214-This server supports the following 
commands:214 HELO EHLO STARTTLS RCPT DATA RSET MAIL QUIT HELP AUTH TURN 
ATRN ETRN BDAT VRFY 
; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|smtp (25/tcp)|11034|NOTE|For some reason, we could not 
send the EICAR test string to this MTA 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|domain (53/tcp)| 
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00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|http (80/tcp)|10932|REPORT|;The IIS server appears to have 
the .HTR ISAPI filter mapped.;;At least one remote vulnerability has been 
discovered for the .HTR;filter. This is detailed in Microsoft Advisory;MS02-018, and 
gives remote SYSTEM level access to the web server. ;;It is recommended that 
even if you have patched this vulnerability that;you unmap the .HTR extension, 
and any other unused ISAPI extensions;if they are not required for the operation 
of your site.;;Solution: ;To unmap the .HTR extension:; 1.Open Internet Services 
Manager. ; 2.Right-click the Web server choose Properties from the context 
menu. ; 3.Master Properties ; 4.Select WWW Service -> Edit -> HomeDirectory -> 
Configuration ;and remove the reference to .htr from the list.;;Risk factor : High 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|http (80/tcp)|10077|INFO|;The remote web server appears to 
be running with;Frontpage extensions. ;;You should double check the 
configuration since;a lot of security problems have been found with;FrontPage 
when the configuration file is;not well set up.;;Risk factor : High if your 
configuration file is;not well set up;CVE : CAN-2000-0114; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|http (80/tcp)|10661|INFO|;IIS 5 has support for the Internet 
Printing Protocol(IPP), which is ;enabled in a default install. The protocol is 
implemented in IIS5 as an ;ISAPI extension. At least one security problem (a 
buffer overflow);has been found with that extension in the past, so we 
recommend;you disable it if you do not use this functionality.;;Solution: ;To 
unmap the .printer extension:; 1.Open Internet Services Manager. ; 2.Right-click 
the Web server choose Properties from the context menu. ; 3.Master Properties ; 
4.Select WWW Service -> Edit -> HomeDirectory -> Configuration ;and remove 
the reference to .printer from the list.;;Risk factor : Low 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|http (80/tcp)|10695|INFO|;The IIS server appears to have the 
.IDA ISAPI filter mapped.;;At least one remote vulnerability has been discovered 
for the .IDA;(indexing service) filter. This is detailed in Microsoft Advisory;MS01-
033, and gives remote SYSTEM level access to the web server. ;;It is 
recommended that even if you have patched this vulnerability that;you unmap 
the .IDA extension, and any other unused ISAPI extensions;if they are not 
required for the operation of your site.;;Solution: ;To unmap the .IDA extension:; 
1.Open Internet Services Manager. ; 2.Right-click the Web server choose 
Properties from the context menu. ; 3.Master Properties ; 4.Select WWW Service -
> Edit -> HomeDirectory -> Configuration ;and remove the reference to .ida from 
the list.;;Risk factor : Medium;CVE : CAN-2002-0071; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|http (80/tcp)|10330|NOTE|A web server is running on this port 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|http (80/tcp)|10107|NOTE|The remote web server type is 
:;;Microsoft-IIS/5.0 
;;Solution : None (IIS does not permit to hide the server version). 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|http (80/tcp)|11032|NOTE|The following directories were 
discovered:;/_vti_bin, /images;The following directories require 
authentication:;/printers 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|kerberos (88/tcp)| 
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00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (135/tcp)|10736|NOTE|The DCE Service 
'LRPC00000118.00000001' is running on this host;     Type : ncalrpc;     UUID : 
5142350d-06e3-d14b-11ab-04c04fc2dc00;     Annotation : MS NT Directory DRS 
Interface; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (135/tcp)|10736|NOTE|The DCE Service 
'LRPC00000118.00000001' is running on this host;     Type : ncalrpc;     UUID : 
cc5a7c0d-64f5-1a42-108c-59082b2f8400;     Annotation : MS NT Directory XDS 
Interface; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (135/tcp)|10736|NOTE|The DCE Service 
'LRPC00000118.00000001' is running on this host;     Type : ncalrpc;     UUID : 
cc5a180d-64f5-1a42-108c-59082b2f8400;     Annotation : MS NT Directory NSP 
Interface; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (135/tcp)|10736|NOTE|The DCE Service 
'LRPC00000118.00000001' is running on this host;     Type : ncalrpc;     UUID : 
3456780d-3412-cd12-abef-01234567cf00; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (135/tcp)|10736|NOTE|The DCE Service 
'LRPC000002fc.00000001' is running on this host;     Type : ncalrpc;     UUID : 
6b0ce00d-0b90-67c7-10b3-17dd01066200; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (135/tcp)| 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10394|REPORT|;. It was possible to log 
into the remote host using a NULL session.;The concept of a NULL session is to 
provide a null username and;a null password, which grants the user the 'guest' 
access;;To prevent null sessions, see MS KB Article Q143474 (NT 4.0) and;Q246261 
(Windows 2000). ;Note that this won't completely disable null sessions, but will 
;prevent them from connecting to IPC$;;. All the smb tests will be done as ''/'' in 
domain  
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10398|INFO|The domain SID can be 
obtained remotely. Its value is :;;ETSU : 5-21-606747145-1409082233-725345543;;An 
attacker can use it to obtain the list of the local users of this host;Solution : filter 
the ports 137 to 139 and 445;Risk factor : Low;;CVE : CVE-2000-1200; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10859|INFO|The host SID can be 
obtained remotely. Its value is :;;ETSU : 5-21-606747145-1409082233-725345543;;An 
attacker can use it to obtain the list of the local users of this host;Solution : filter 
the ports 137 to 139 and 445;Risk factor : Low;;CVE : CVE-2000-1200; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10399|INFO|The domain SID could be 
used to enumerate the names of the users;of this domain. ;(we only enumerated 
users name whose ID is between 1000 and 1200;for performance reasons);This 
gives extra knowledge to an attacker, which;is not a good thing : ;- 
Administrator account name : Administrator (id 500);- Guest account name : 
NotGuest (id 501);- TsInternetUser (id 1000);- IUSR_JCDC1 (id 1001);- 
IWAM_JCDC1 (id 1002);- WINS Users (id 1003);- JCDC1$ (id 1004);- DnsAdmins (id 
1105);- DnsUpdateProxy (id 1106);- QIP Users (id 1108);- JCDC2$ (id 1109);- 
ETSUADMIN$ (id 1110);- ServiceAD (id 1111);- IMAIL$ (id 1112);- PWRK12$ (id 
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1113);- Exchange Domain Servers (id 1123);- Exchange Enterprise Servers (id 
1124);- antivirus_root (id 1129);- IMailDevelopers (id 1130);- NAI Software Users (id 
1131);- Networking (id 1132);- OIT (id 1133);- User Services (id 1137);- BCOOK (id 
1138);- CAPPSL (id 1139);- COM (id 1146);- Multimedia (id 1147);- Test Group (id 
1148);- 62E54D8C-5B5B-4373-8 (id 1151);- STEVE (id 1164);- ETSU86342$ (id 1166);- 
WEBDEV$ (id 1173);- ETSU86343$ (id 1174);- ETSUFE1$ (id 1175);- B2FD3B0A-3263-
43EF-A (id 1178);- HELPDESK2$ (id 1179);- ARAdmins (id 1181);- ETSUCM$ (id 
1182);- loftusc (id 1184);- faculty root (id 1185);- Faculty web (id 1186);- TracData 
(id 1187);- ABALDWIN (id 1188);- JANET (id 1189);- BachAccessDB (id 1190);- 
Nursing (id 1191);- Registrar (id 1192);- ETSU87863$ (id 1193);- WAGOLD$ (id 
1194);- mike (id 1195);- docwarehouse (id 1198);- BRAGG (id 1199);;Risk factor : 
Medium;Solution : filter incoming connections this port;;CVE : CVE-2000-1200; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10785|NOTE|The remote native lan 
manager is : Windows 2000 LAN Manager;The remote Operating System is : 
Windows 5.0;The remote SMB Domain Name is : ETSU; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10428|NOTE|;;Nessus did not access 
the remote registry completely,;because this needs to be logged in as 
administrator.;;If you want the permissions / values of all the sensitive;registry keys 
to be checked for, we recommend that;you fill the 'SMB Login' options in 
the;'Prefs.' section of the client by the administrator;login name and 
password.;;** Since the password will be sent in clear text, we;suggest you 
change its value for something else;during the test, as anyone will be able to 
eavesdrop;it;;*** If you are working in a highly sensitive;environment where a 
second of insecurity;may be critical to you, then forget this;warning and use 
other tools to check locally;the security of your NT keys.;;Risk factor : None 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10428|NOTE|;;Nessus did not access 
the remote registry completely,;because this needs to be logged in as 
administrator.;;If you want the permissions / values of all the sensitive;registry keys 
to be checked for, we recommend that;you fill the 'SMB Login' options in 
the;'Prefs.' section of the client by the administrator;login name and 
password.;;** Since the password will be sent in clear text, we;suggest you 
change its value for something else;during the test, as anyone will be able to 
eavesdrop;it;;*** If you are working in a highly sensitive;environment where a 
second of insecurity;may be critical to you, then forget this;warning and use 
other tools to check locally;the security of your NT keys.;;Risk factor : None 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|ldap (389/tcp)| 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|https (443/tcp)|10330|NOTE|An unknown service is running 
on this port.;It is usually reserved for HTTPS 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|https (443/tcp)| 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|microsoft-ds (445/tcp)|10330|NOTE|An unknown service is 
running on this port.;It is usually reserved for SMTPS 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|microsoft-ds (445/tcp)| 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|kpasswd (464/tcp)| 
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00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (593/tcp)|10763|INFO|This detects the http-rpc-
epmap service by connecting;to the port 593 and processing the buffer 
received.;;This endpoint mapper provides CIS (COM+ Internet 
Services);parameters like port 135 (epmap) for RPC.;;Solution:;Deny incoming 
traffic from the Internet to TCP port 593;as it may become a security threat in the 
future, if a;vulnerability is discovered.;;For more information about 
CIS:;http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/en-us/dndcom/html/cis.asp;;Risk factor : 
Low 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|ldaps (636/tcp)| 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1026/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening 
on 151.141.8.101:1026 : ;;     Type: ncacn_ip_tcp;     UUID : 5142350d-06e3-d14b-
11ab-04c04fc2dc00;     Annotation : MS NT Directory DRS Interface; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1026/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening 
on 151.141.4.7:1026 : ;;     Type: ncacn_ip_tcp;     UUID : 5142350d-06e3-d14b-
11ab-04c04fc2dc00;     Annotation : MS NT Directory DRS Interface; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1026/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening 
on 151.141.8.101:1026 : ;;     Type: ncacn_ip_tcp;     UUID : cc5a7c0d-64f5-1a42-
108c-59082b2f8400;     Annotation : MS NT Directory XDS Interface; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1026/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening 
on 151.141.4.7:1026 : ;;     Type: ncacn_ip_tcp;     UUID : cc5a7c0d-64f5-1a42-
108c-59082b2f8400;     Annotation : MS NT Directory XDS Interface; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1026/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening 
on 151.141.8.101:1026 : ;;     Type: ncacn_ip_tcp;     UUID : cc5a180d-64f5-1a42-
108c-59082b2f8400;     Annotation : MS NT Directory NSP Interface; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1026/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening 
on 151.141.4.7:1026 : ;;     Type: ncacn_ip_tcp;     UUID : cc5a180d-64f5-1a42-
108c-59082b2f8400;     Annotation : MS NT Directory NSP Interface; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1026/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening 
on 151.141.8.101:1026 : ;;     Type: ncacn_ip_tcp;     UUID : 3456780d-3412-cd12-
abef-01234567cf00; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1026/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening 
on 151.141.4.7:1026 : ;;     Type: ncacn_ip_tcp;     UUID : 3456780d-3412-cd12-
abef-01234567cf00; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1026/tcp)| 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1029/tcp)|10761|INFO|There is a CIS (COM+ 
Internet Services) on this port;Server banner :;ncacn_http/1.0 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1029/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening 
on 151.141.8.101:1029 : ;;     Type: ncacn_ip_unknown!;     UUID : 5142350d-06e3-
d14b-11ab-04c04fc2dc00;     Annotation : MS NT Directory DRS Interface; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1029/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening 
on 151.141.4.7:1029 : ;;     Type: ncacn_ip_unknown!;     UUID : 5142350d-06e3-
d14b-11ab-04c04fc2dc00;     Annotation : MS NT Directory DRS Interface; 
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00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1029/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening 
on 151.141.8.101:1029 : ;;     Type: ncacn_ip_unknown!;     UUID : cc5a7c0d-64f5-
1a42-108c-59082b2f8400;     Annotation : MS NT Directory XDS Interface; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1029/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening 
on 151.141.4.7:1029 : ;;     Type: ncacn_ip_unknown!;     UUID : cc5a7c0d-64f5-
1a42-108c-59082b2f8400;     Annotation : MS NT Directory XDS Interface; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1029/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening 
on 151.141.8.101:1029 : ;;     Type: ncacn_ip_unknown!;     UUID : cc5a180d-64f5-
1a42-108c-59082b2f8400;     Annotation : MS NT Directory NSP Interface; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1029/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening 
on 151.141.4.7:1029 : ;;     Type: ncacn_ip_unknown!;     UUID : cc5a180d-64f5-
1a42-108c-59082b2f8400;     Annotation : MS NT Directory NSP Interface; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1029/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening 
on 151.141.8.101:1029 : ;;     Type: ncacn_ip_unknown!;     UUID : 3456780d-3412-
cd12-abef-01234567cf00; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1029/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening 
on 151.141.4.7:1029 : ;;     Type: ncacn_ip_unknown!;     UUID : 3456780d-3412-
cd12-abef-01234567cf00; 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1040/tcp)| 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1088/tcp)| 
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1147/tcp)| 
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